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MAD WOMEN AND DESPERATE GIRLS: 
INFANTICIDE AND CHILD MURDER IN LAW AND 
MYTH 
ELIZABETH RAPAPORT* 
“Can a mother forget the baby at her breast and have no compassion for 
the child she has borne?”1
Scarlet the Cat of Brooklyn, NY: “In a motherly show of courage, a cat 
raced into a burning building to rescue her five kittens, one by one.  And 
then with her eyes blistered shut and her paws burned, she made a head 
count of her young ones, touching each one with her nose to make sure 
they were all safe.”
 
2
 
 
In the United States, unlike the United Kingdom and many other 
countries, there is no distinctive legislation addressing the killing of infants 
and young children by their mothers.  While our British cousins embarked 
upon a course of special legislation in 1922 that evolved into a policy of 
partial decriminalization and medicalization of maternal infanticide,3
 
*Elizabeth Rapaport, Dickason Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.  My research 
on infanticide and child homicide began when I was a Visiting Scholar enjoying the 
hospitality of the Center for the Study of Law & Society Center at the School of Law, 
University of California, Berkeley, in 2001-2002.  I am particularly grateful for the 
assistance of the law librarians at Boalt Hall, and to the law librarians at UNM School of 
Law, and most especially to Lorraine Lester.  I was fortunate to have able and diligent 
research assistance from Brigid Connelly, of the University of Connecticut School of Law, 
and Erin Kutinac, of the University of New Mexico School of Law.  I am grateful for 
helpful discussions of earlier drafts of this article presented at the University of Delaware, 
the University of Connecticut School of Law, and the annual meetings of the Association 
for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities and of the Law & Society Association in 
2005.  Sharon Derrick, Ph.D., Injury Surveillance Coordinator, Disease Control and Medical 
Epidemiology, Harris County Public Health and Environmental Services, graciously 
assisted me in understanding some of the complexities of child fatality accounting in Texas 
and the United States generally. 
 the 
 1. Isaiah 49:15 (New International Version). 
 2. Sarah Christian, Feline Risks Life to Save Five Kittens, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 1, 
1996. 
 3. Infanticide Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 1 (Eng.), amended by Infanticide 
Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.). 
RAPAPORT_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:15 PM 
102 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  [Vol. XXXIII 
United States has no distinct law or even settled policies on infanticide.  As 
a result, outcomes in cases raising similar mental health defenses can vary 
radically, from medical diversion to capital punishment.4  Yet, in the 
United States, as in the United Kingdom, two figures, or archetypes, 
dominate representations of infanticide in popular media and in 
scholarship: the mad woman and the desperate girl.5  In the United 
Kingdom, settled law and policy reflect the conception of maternal 
infanticide as the work of women who are victims of biology gone awry, 
and of women and girls who, due to immaturity or adverse circumstances, 
are not able to accept the maternal role.6
 
 4. For example, consider the cases of Andrea Yates, Ellen Feinberg, and Christina 
Riggs, three severely depressed women who killed their children.  Yates and Feinberg were 
also psychotic at the time of their crimes according to the prosecution’s psychiatric experts.  
Yates was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life for drowning her five young 
children in 2001.  See infra.  The conviction was reversed in Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215, 
222 (Tex. App. 2005).  Prosecutors are contesting the reversal.  See Andrew Tilghman, 
Appeals Court Won’t Review Its Yates Ruling; Prosecutors Vow to Continue the Fight; 
Mother Who Killed Her Five Children Could Get New Trial, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 9, 2005, 
at B3 (discussing how the conviction turned on the testimony of Dr. Park Dietz, who found 
that Yates was sane under Texas law, although psychotic).  Ellen Feinberg stabbed her two 
sons, six and ten years of age, killing one and grievously injuring the second in Champaign, 
Illinois in 2002.  Steve Bauer, Fate Hinges on Mental Health, NEWS GAZETTE (Champaign, 
Ill.), Dec 4, 2002.  Defense and state psychiatrists agreed that Feinberg was insane under 
Illinois law.  She was found not guilty by reason of insanity.  Dr. Dietz, the state’s expert, 
found that Feinberg suffered from severe depression and was psychotic when she stabbed 
her sons.  Steve Bauer, A Mother’s Madness, NEWS GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), Dec 8, 2002 
[hereinafter Bauer, Mother’s Madness].  Christina Riggs was sentenced to death in 1999 for 
the murder of her two children, aged two and five.  Riggs v. State, 3 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Ark. 
1999).  She was executed in Arkansas in 2000. Death Penalty Information Center, 
Searchable Database of Executions, 
  In the United States, lacking 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2006).  Suicidally depressed, Riggs “didn’t want to die and leave [her] kids 
behind . . . .”  Riggs, 3 S.W.3d at 311.  She killed them but failed in her attempted suicide.  
Id. at 307-08. 
 5. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American 
Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22-29, 42-49 (1996) [hereinafter Oberman, Mothers 
Who Kill] (providing an outstanding treatment of the issues of law and law reform raised by 
teenage neonaticide).  The question of justice for mentally ill women who kill their children 
came to the fore again in 2002 in the Yates case.  See generally Deborah W. Denno, Who is 
Andrea Yates?  A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLICY 1 (2003) 
(providing an excellent treatment of the Yates case and the issues of law and law reform it 
raises); Ania Wilczynski, Images of Women Who Kill Their Infants: The Mad and the Bad, 2 
WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 71 (1991) (an influential article developing the theme that women 
who kill their infants are sorted into dichotomous categories, mad and bad, both of which 
reflect gender stereotypical distortions of the defendants and their cases). 
 6. In the 1970s, British reformers sought and failed to expand the protection of the 
Infanticide Act to explicitly include women and girls overwhelmed by poverty or their own 
immaturity or lack of coping skills.  De facto, however, British practice had expanded in 
that direction and continued to expand, treating such women and girls as females thwarted 
in their development as mothers by social and psychological limitations or adversity.  See 
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settled law, the dynamic in high profile infanticide cases such as those of 
Andrea Yates7 in Houston, and Susan Smith8 in South Carolina, often 
propel prosecutors to seek severe sentences and to exploit the counter-
narrative of evil.  While both explanations—evil and biology—have 
cultural resonance, the biological explanation may have more traction.  
Prosecutors have learned that infanticide defendants have powerful allies in 
prevalent conceptions of motherhood.9  That a mature woman could be 
both a sane and lethal mother is not an easy sell.  Indeed, prosecutors have 
difficulty convincing juries that lethal fathers are evil as well,10
The mad woman and the desperate girl are beguiling stereotypes that 
distort the social facts of infanticide and child homicide in the United 
States.  Men commit more homicides of infants and children than women.
 but cases 
about fathers rarely attract the notoriety that cases about mothers spawn. 
11
 
generally R. D. Mackay, The Consequences of Killing Very Young Children, 1993 CRIM. L. 
REV. 21, 21. 
  
Why, then, do treatments of infanticide in the popular media, and in legal 
and forensic scholarship, amplify the role of women and mute the role of 
men?  Why is the mental health of male killers of relatively little interest, 
despite the fact that the population of fathers who kill includes substantial 
 7. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 215. 
 8. Susan Smith was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life for drowning her 
two sons. The Smith verdict was met with mixed reactions.  See Rick Bragg, Carolina Jury 
Rejects Execution for Woman Who Drowned Sons, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1995, §1, at 1 
[hereinafter Bragg, Carolina Jury]. 
 9. Probing the social and legal construction of motherhood has been central to the work 
of critical feminism.  Among the seminal contributions are MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, 
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 
(1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. 
U. J. GENDER & L. 7 (1993); and Carol Sanger, M is for Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 15 (1992).  This literature disentangles and demystifies the role of biology, 
culture, and law in prevalent conceptions of motherhood. 
 10. See Charles A. Phipps, Responding to Child Homicide: A Statutory Proposal, 89 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535, 536-40 (1999).  Goaded by the frustrations prosecutors 
experience when juries balk at finding parents of both sexes and other caretakers guilty of 
intentional killing in child abuse deaths, Phipps advocates legislation creating a felony 
murder offense, predicated on child abuse.  The effect of such legislation would be to 
relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving intent to kill or recklessness in order to 
secure a murder conviction.  Id. at 584-93. 
 11. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE 
U.S.: INFANTICIDE, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/children.htm 
[hereinafter BJS, INFANTICIDE] (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).  Over a twenty-five year period, 
from 1976 to 2002, mothers accounted for thirty percent and fathers for thirty-one percent of 
homicides of children under five years of age.  Male acquaintances—the boyfriends and 
lovers of mothers—however, accounted for an additional twenty-three percent of homicides 
of children under five years of age.  Id. 
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numbers of men suffering from psychosis and severe depression?12  The 
majority of homicides of infants and children are committed in the course 
of child abuse by parents and other household intimates who do not suffer 
from severe mental illness.13  Why is our attention attracted to the cases 
where a biological explanation is offered for maternal lethality and not the 
larger class of child abuse homicides committed by both sexes?14  When 
the subject is infanticide and child murder, in sum, mothers who kill are 
brought to the foreground, the role of men is obscured, and the focus is not 
on intra-family violence, but rather on the piquant question, “Is the mother 
mad or bad?”15
My answer to the questions propounded above, in brief, is that 
infanticide, from the dawn of the criminalization of this ancient practice to 
the present, has been less about the protection of children than the 
regulation of women.  We profess our commitment to children, but our 
practice reveals an unimpressive record of child protection and abiding 
anxieties about female sexuality and motherhood.  Our attention slides 
from the nominal subject—protecting children—to the interesting subject 
of motherhood.  Thus, while the legal regime in the United Kingdom 
recognizes the links between maternal mental illness and child homicide, it 
does not provide a beacon that can lead us to a comprehensive policy 
addressing infanticide and child homicide.  We must wean ourselves from 
our excessive preoccupation with female deviance and attend to other 
causes of child homicide if we are to craft effective prevention policies and 
just criminal law responses. 
 
I begin this article with a comparison between the stereotype-dominated 
understanding of infanticide and child homicide in the United States and 
the statistical landscape it obscures.  I then turn to the history of the crime 
of infanticide, a history which confirms that a fascination with deviant 
women has long dominated the story of infanticide.  The article concludes 
 
 12. Phillip J. Resnick, Child Murder by Parents: A Psychiatric Review of Filicide, 126 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 325 (1969) [hereinafter Resnick, Child Murder].  In this path-breaking 
work in the late 1960s, Phillip J. Resnick, M.D. found that a significant number of infant 
and child homicides are committed by fathers with severe mental health problems.  Despite 
this well-known and seminal work, more recent scholars have largely ignored male parents 
who kill their infants and children.  See Phillip J. Resnick, Murder of the Newborn: A 
Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1414 (1970) [hereinafter 
Resnick, Murder of the Newborn]. 
 13. David Finkelhor, The Homicides of Children and Youth: A Developmental 
Perspective, in OUT OF THE DARKNESS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 
17, 24-26 (Glenda Kaufman Kantor & Jana L. Jasinski eds., 1997). 
 14. See Phipps, supra note 10, at 542.  The exception is scholarship that reflects the 
perspective of prosecutors.  See id. at 536-37. 
 15. Wilczynski, supra note 5, uses this telling phrase in the title of her article. 
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with the exploration of what I call the “Good Mother Defense.”  That 
exploration reveals the extent to which the fate of a woman tried for child 
homicide hinges on whether the jury sees her as a good mother, rather than 
on the prosecutors’ ability to prove the elements of the crime charged. 
I. INFANTICIDE AND CHILD HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES IN MYTH 
AND FACT, WITH AN ILLUSTRATIVE LOOK AT TEXAS 
In 1997, a young Dallas County matron named Darlie Routier was 
convicted in the stabbing death of two of her young sons, aged five and six, 
and sentenced to death.16  The Routier case did not achieve the degree of 
sustained national and international notoriety attained by that of Andrea 
Yates, the Houston mother who drowned all five of her children in 2001,17 
or Susan Smith, the South Carolina mother who rolled her car and with it 
her two young sons into a lake in 1996, then accused a fictional black 
stranger of kidnapping her children.18  The eyes of Texas, however, were 
fixed on Darlie Routier, as hers was one of that class of maternal 
infanticide and child homicide cases that had the potential to captivate 
media audiences: those committed by middle class, married, typically 
white, women.19  Unlike Yates, Routier did not defend on grounds of 
insanity, but instead, denied her guilt.  Why, Texas mused, did Routier 
erupt in slaughter in the midst of her prosperous suburban life, anchored in 
a successful marriage?  How could Routier, even though her skirts were 
short,20
 
 16. See Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).  Routier was 
convicted of the capital murder of a child under six, her five-year-old son Daman.  The 
evidence also supported the stabbing and killing of her six-year-old son Devon, with which 
she was not charged.  See id. 
 kill her children?  Although answers to these questions proved 
elusive, the state of Texas sought and obtained capital justice for the slain 
children.  Prosecutors proclaimed at her trial, 
 17. Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215, 216-17 (Tex. App. 2005). 
 18. Bragg, Carolina Jury, supra note 8, at 1. 
 19. See John W. Gonzalez, A Human Tragedy/Trial to Open in Deaths of Two Children, 
HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 5, 1997, at A1 [hereinafter Gonzalez, Human Tragedy].  The Ellen 
Feinberg case is another example of such a regional sensation; Feinberg is herself a 
physician and is married to another physician.  See Bauer, Mother’s Madness, supra note 4. 
 20. See Gonzalez, Human Tragedy, supra note 19 (criticism of Routier’s taste was a 
theme in the publicity surrounding her case which took note of Routier’s body piercings and 
tattoos); see also John W. Gonzalez, Routier Gave Baby Sitter Drugs, Humiliated Kids, 
Witnesses Say, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1997, at A13 [hereinafter Gonzalez, Baby Sitter] 
(quoting a witness saying that “Routier dressed ‘very  tacky—everything was showing’”).  
Readers of this article may draw their own conclusions about Routier’s style by viewing the 
2003 television documentary about her case.  See 48 Hours Mystery: Precious Angels, A 
Shocking Crime (CBS television broadcast Aug. 20, 2003). 
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If you kill our children, we will come after you[.] . . . When you take the 
life of a child in the state of Texas, you better get ready to pay the 
price[.]21
I ask you to have as much compassion as she had for her children[.] . . . I 
ask you to tell the nation that in Texas we protect our children.  If you 
harm our children, you will feel the full extent of our laws.
 
22
These boasts, or promises, reflect Texas law, which has ample statutory 
grounds for severe treatment of child homicide.  The murder of a child 
under six may on that account be prosecuted as capital murder.
 
23  Texas 
law also supplies a means of sentencing someone to life or as much as 
ninety-nine years imprisonment if he or she intentionally or knowingly 
engages in conduct that causes serious injury to a child; thus, someone who 
cannot be successfully prosecuted for murder because he or she lacked 
intent to kill can be severely punished under Texas law for child abuse that 
resulted in the death of the child.24  Should the issue of insanity surface in a 
Texas child homicide case, the defendant is confronted with a particularly 
forbidding version of the M’Naghten or cognitive test; the sole question 
upon which the defendant’s legal responsibility turns is whether he or she 
knew the act of killing was wrong.25  There need be no inquiry into, or 
proof as to whether mental disease or defect rendered the defendant 
incapable of either controlling his or her actions or appreciating the nature 
of the crime, as would be the case in more liberal jurisdictions.26
 
 21. Ralph Winingham, Routier Given Death—Killer Mom Stoic as Sentence Read, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 5, 1997, at A1 (District Attorney Greg Davis, addressing the 
jury in the penalty phase of the capital trial). 
  Thus, in 
the case of Andrea Yates, a woman acknowledged by both defense and 
prosecution to be gravely mentally ill, it was possible for a jury to find her 
sane under Texas law even if they believed her own tormented account of 
 22. John W. Gonzalez, Jury Orders Death Penalty for Routier: 27-Year-Old 
Homemaker Shows Very Little Emotion, HOUS. CHRON., Feb 5, 1997, at A1 (Assistant 
District Attorney Sherri Wallace, asking jury to sentence “evil-hearted” Routier to death). 
 23. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8) (Vernon 2005) (if the victim is under six years 
of age, a murder is eligible for prosecution as capital murder).  Texas is one of at least ten 
states that treats murder of a child as a circumstance permitting capital punishment. 
 24. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.32, 22.04 (Vernon 2005) (a person commits the 
felony in the first degree, Injury to a Child, if he intentionally or knowingly causes serious 
injury to child fourteen years of age or younger). 
 25. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2005); see Denno, supra note 5, at 12-17 
(outlining the M’Naghten test and the Texas version of the test). 
 26. For a history and survey of the tests used in insanity law in the United States, see 
Deborah Giorgi-Guarnieri et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for Forensic Psychiatric 
Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
S1, S4-S9 (Supp. 2002). 
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her struggle to save her children from Satan.27
In the wake of the Yates trial in 2002, Texas media gave extensive 
coverage to a small, shocking spate of child homicides committed by 
middle class, married mothers.  Unlike Yates, whose sole taste of legal 
mercy was a life sentence where death could have been imposed, two of 
these women, Lisa Diaz
 
28 and Deanna Laney, were acquitted by reason of 
insanity,29 and the third, Dena Schlosser, was initially found incompetent to 
stand trial.30  Two of these mothers, Laney31 and Schlosser,32 like Yates, 
were intensely religious and obedient to command hallucinations.  The 
third, Lisa Ann Diaz, suffered from the delusion that death would release 
her and her children from imagined disease.33  All three cases, like that of 
Andrea Yates, were lurid, brutal, and reeked of madness.  Schlosser 
severed her infant daughter’s arms in a tortured, idiosyncratic submission 
to a charismatic preacher and a verse in the bible.34  Laney bashed the 
heads of her six and eight-year-old sons with a rock in response to divine 
“signs.”35
 
 27. Yates condemned herself as possessed by Satan, and therefore a bad mother who 
had ruined her children.  Denno, supra note 
  Although it is possible that the leniency accorded these women 
is in some part a reaction to the outcry against illiberal Texas law in the 
5, at 42-43.  She killed them so that their early 
deaths would gain them entrance to heaven; had they grown to maturity, their responsibility 
for the evil in them for which she was responsible would have damned them.  Id.  Yet Yates 
knew she had done legal wrong; she herself called the police to notify them of her crimes. 
 28. Glenna Whitley, Psycho Mom, DALLAS OBSERVER, Jan. 20, 2005.  Diaz, a Latina, 
otherwise fits the high notoriety profile: Although she was the product of privation, her 
second marriage, to Angel Diaz, a well-educated quality control manager, allowed her to 
become a suburban stay-at-home wife and mom.  See id. 
 29. Rick Casey, Mad Moms, Insane Law, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 19, 2004, at B1. 
 30. Thomas Korosec, Accused Mother Not Fit for Trial, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2005. 
at B1. 
 31. Lee Hancock, Driven by a VOICE . . . , DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 18, 2004, at 
1H.  Laney had no known history of mental illness, but psychiatrists, including Dr. Deitz, 
agreed she was insane when she killed her children.  Laney “believed God had chosen her 
and Ms. Yates to be witnesses foretold in the book of Revelation . . . and would preach 
God’s word.”  Id. 
 32. Jennifer Emily, Dad’s “Lack of Emotion” in Baby’s Death in Psychiatric Report, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb 11, 2005, at 1A [hereinafter Emily, Lack of Emotion] 
(recounting Dena Schlosser’s psychiatric history and the circumstances of her crime); see 
also Jennifer Emily, Mom Thanked God After Attack, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec.16, 
2004, at 4B. 
 33. Whitley, supra note 28. 
 34. Emily, Lack of Emotion, supra note 32.  The bible verse, from Matthew, was: “If thy 
right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of 
thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell.”  Thomas 
Korosec, Mom to Officer: “I Felt Like I Had To”; New Details Emerge in Case: 
Psychiatrist to Weigh Woman’s Mental State, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 15, 2004, at B4. 
 35. Whitley, supra note 28. 
RAPAPORT_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:15 PM 
108 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  [Vol. XXXIII 
wake of the Yates case, 36 deranged mothers had received leniency in 
Texas long before Andrea Yates became a synonym for injustice to this 
class of defendants in Texas and elsewhere in the United States.37
The Laney, Diaz, and Schlosser cases provide Texas with a distorted 
prism through which to view the landscape of infanticide, just as the Yates 
case and the even more media-genic Susan Smith case misdirected the 
nation at large.  Notorious cases such as these nurture myths, or 
misconceptions, about infanticide.
 
38
One myth is that infants and small children are safe in the bosoms of 
their families.  Notorious trials foster the comforting notion that infanticidal 
killers are rare instances of madness or abject moral failure so exotic as to 
defy understanding by the good, good-enough, and not-so-good parents that 
make up the public and trial juries.  In fact, children under five years of age 
are exposed to considerable homicide risk at home.  While the incidence of 
homicide of victims under five years of age is a subject of dispute, even 
estimates at the conservative end of the range challenge the notion that the 
youngest Americans are safe at home.
 
39
 
 36. See, e.g., Rick Casey, Devils on the Head of a Pin, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2004, at 
A17; Rick Casey, Yates Wins: Shrink Was Delusional, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 7, 2005, at B1; 
see also Casey, supra note 
  There is no disputing that the 
29, at B1. 
 37. Two well-publicized cases were those of Evonne Rodriquez and Juana Leija.  
Rodriquez, a schizophrenic, was acquitted by reason of insanity for killing her four-month-
old son in 1997.  Todd Ackerman, Confined Patient Pregnant Again, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 
8, 2004, at A1.  Leija attempted to drown six of her seven children in Buffalo Bayou.  Four 
were saved by passersby and two drowned.  She received a ten year probationary sentence 
in recognition of mental illness exacerbated by an abusive husband.  Rosanna Ruiz, Woman 
Who Threw Children in Bayou is Mending Her Life, HOUS. CHRON., July 4, 2001, at A29. 
 38. The term “infanticide” has disparate and overlapping connotations, one of which is 
the killing of a newborn or infant by its mother or parent.  Other usages do not involve any 
limitation on the relationship of the perpetrator to the victim, nor do they limit the age of the 
child strictly to infancy.  This article adopts the more comprehensive usage.  See, e.g., BJS, 
INFANTICIDE, supra note 11 (the U.S Department of Justice, defines “infanticide” as the 
homicide of a child less than five years of age by any perpetrator).  Including young 
children in the “infanticide” category is useful because infants and young children face a 
similar magnitude of risk and source of risk of homicide.  The focus of this article is on 
homicide of infants and young children by their parents and other household intimates. 
 39. Estimates of the number of child homicides vary.  U.S. Department of Justice annual 
statistics may be taken as establishing the lower bound; BJS reports between 550 and 
slightly less than 800 infanticides homicides of children under five per annum over the ten 
year period from 1991 to 2000. See BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11.  The number of 
homicides of all victims ranged from around 15,500 to 24,700 over the same period.  
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.: 
HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION, 1950-2002, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/totalstab.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).  The 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that approximately one thousand 
children under five perished by child abuse and neglect in 2001.  See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN 
& FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2001: 
RAPAPORT_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:15 PM 
2006] MAD WOMEN & DESPARATE GIRLS  109 
majority of infanticides are perpetrated by the parents of the victims, and 
that the step-parents, lovers of parents, other family, and other caretakers 
fill out the cast of lethal agents.40  In contrast, children between five and 
twelve years of age are the least likely age group to die by homicide,41 but 
the source of risk is the same for younger and older children: the majority 
of older children who perish by homicide are victims of their parents and 
other household intimates.42  Teenagers, who are at high risk of homicide, 
die at the hands of other teens and young adults.43
A second misconception is that infanticide is a woman’s crime and 
indeed a mother’s crime.  Parents are responsible for infanticidal killings in 
the majority of cases; almost equal numbers of mothers and fathers kill 
victims under five years of age—thirty and thirty-one percent 
respectively.
 
44
 
FATALITIES, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm01/chapterfive.htm 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2006).  Another report estimates this population to be at least two 
thousand.  See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, A NATION’S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
REPORT OF THE U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 9 (1995) [hereinafter, 
ADVISORY BOARD, CHILD ABUSE].  Some experts argue that underreporting is more 
extensive.  See generally Bernard Ewigman et al., The Missouri Child Fatality Study: 
Underreporting of Maltreatment Fatalities Among Children Younger Than Five Years of 
Age, 1983 Through 1986, 91 PEDIATRICS 330 (1993); Phillip W. McClain et al., Estimates of 
Fatal Child Abuse and Neglect, United States, 1979 through 1988, 91 PEDIATRICS 338 
(1993).  At the upper bound of estimation, the homicide risk of young children exceeds that 
of adults.  See ADVISORY BOARD, CHILD ABUSE, supra at 8.  The public’s ignorance of the 
extent of abuse and neglect fatalities can be attributed to poor investigative and accounting 
practices of law enforcement and medical and child protection agencies.  Id. at 8-9; see also 
Finkelhor, supra note 
  Boyfriends and lovers—“male acquaintances” in the 
parlance of the US Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics—
13, at 23 (noting a second reason for underestimation, namely, 
ambiguity about whether cases of negligent maltreatment meet the standards for criminal 
homicide).  There are plausible explanations for why the true rate of infanticidal crime is 
uncertain, contested, and the subject of such widely varying estimates.  Homicides of young 
children are difficult to distinguish from accidental deaths (was the child pushed or did she 
fall?) and from death by natural processes (was the baby suffocated or stillborn or die of 
sudden infant crib death?).  Police and child protection investigations are in many cases 
perfunctory, of poor quality, or absent.  There are also questions about appropriate criteria to 
be used in determining whether to count child maltreatment deaths as homicides in cases 
where homicide charges were not pursued. 
 40. BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11 (reporting that between 1976-2002, only three 
percent of homicide victims under five years of age were known to have been killed by 
strangers). 
 41. Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 26 (noting that the majority of homicide victims five to 
twelve years of age are killed by family members). 
 42. Id. at 26-27. 
 43. Id. at 19. 
 44. BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11 (therefore, in total, parents were responsible for 
sixty-one percent of infanticides). 
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are responsible for an additional twenty-three percent of infanticides.45  
Men predominate in the homicide of children less than one year of age, as 
they do with the older under-fives.46  Only newborns and children under 
one week in age are at greatest risk from their mothers.47
The third myth or distortion is an exaggerated notion of the prevalence 
of severe mental illness in the population who commit infanticide.
 
48  The 
post-Yates Texas trio had psychiatric histories that inevitably raise 
questions about whether families, doctors and social agencies could have 
acted to avert these homicides and alleviated the suffering of these afflicted 
women.49  Similarly, those who followed the Yates case learned that 
Andrea Yates was diagnosed as a schizophrenic with psychotic features, 
had attempted suicide, and had suffered from bouts of postpartum 
psychosis.50
 
 45. Id. (According to BJS, in total eighty-two percent of infanticides were committed by 
males). 
  Likewise, the sentencing phase of Susan Smith’s death 
penalty trial revealed that Smith had been molested as a teenager by her 
 46. See Mary D. Overpeck et al., Risk Factors for Infant Homicide in the United States, 
339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211, 1211 (1998) (reporting a survey of relevant literature and 
noting that the majority of perpetrators of homicides of infants older than one week are 
male). 
 47. See L. Paulozzi, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Variation in Homicide 
Risk During Infancy—United States, 1989-98, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 
187, 189 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5109.pdf (reporting 
that of those child fatalities treated as homicides by the CDC, “89% of the known 
perpetrators of infants killed in the first week of life were female, usually the mother”).  
Paulozzi found that, between 1989 and 1998, 9.1 percent of homicides of children under one 
year of age occurring during the first week of life.  Id. at 187-88. 
 48. Resnick, Child Murder, supra note 12, at 328-30.  Resnick identified five “motives” 
for parental child murder in his seminal work; three of these are: unwanted infant, accidental 
death resulting from child beating, and revenge upon a spouse.  Id.  These three categories 
have failed to inspire the same subsequent research attention as the two other categories, 
both involving mental illness: severe depression and psychosis.  See id.  Two of the 
categories, child beating and spousal revenge, prefigure a more contemporary perspective, 
which sees child abuse and therefore child fatalities as integral to problems of family 
violence.  See ADVISORY BOARD, CHILD ABUSE supra note 39, at 14-15.  The authors of the 
prosecution-oriented report dispute the assumption that abusive parents who kill are usually 
mentally ill, and indeed find persuasive that the extreme force employed in many abuse 
cases suggests that many abusive parents are conscious of risk of death.  Id.  To recognize 
the importance of domestic violence in the landscape of child homicide, however, does not 
necessarily lead to a punitive perspective.  See generally Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, 
Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective on Child Abuse, 18 INT’L J. HEALTH 
SERVICES 97 (1988).  It is also integral to feminist work, such as that of Stark and Flitcraft, 
who emphasize the importance of poverty alleviation, female empowerment, and the ill 
effects of at least tacit acceptance of men as inherently violent.  Id. 
 49. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text. 
 50. See generally Denno, supra note 5, at 26-36. 
RAPAPORT_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:15 PM 
2006] MAD WOMEN & DESPARATE GIRLS  111 
stepfather,51 that she suffered from severe and recurrent depression,52 (and 
that her mother had refused to allow treatment when depression surfaced in 
the wake of the molestation,53 and that she, like Yates, had attempted 
suicide.54  While delusional psychosis and severe depression are very real 
features of the infanticide landscape, prevalent in parents of both sexes who 
kill, the largest fraction of infanticides are “child abuse” or “abuse and 
neglect” fatalities.55  These are homicides by parents and members, or 
familiars, of the household that have the characteristics that, if proven, 
would constitute a range of offenses from criminally negligent homicide to 
first degree and capital murder.  The majority of these deaths are not the 
product of an intent to kill.56  They result from negligent or reckless failure 
to provide care, or with even greater frequency, the infliction of violence 
on the frail and vulnerable bodies of infants and young children.57
Turning to the phenomenon of teenage neonaticide, just as with mature 
women, it is the middle class teenager that captivates the public, rather than 
the larger class of such crimes committed in poverty.  Neonaticide in any 
social class is typically an instrumental act, however fraught the 
circumstances may be for the teenager or young woman who refuses 
motherhood.
  These 
children die because the violence inflicted upon them far exceeds any safe 
or measured expression of anger, frustration, or discipline, not for the first 
time, in many or most cases, but for the final and fatal time.  Although 
mentally ill parents like Yates pose grave risks to children and are 
sometimes severely punished despite their afflictions, the majority of those 
who kill infants and small children are sane by the standards of the most 
liberal jurisdictions in the United States. 
58
 
 51. Rick Bragg, In South Carolina, a Mother’s Defense, and Life, Could Hinge on 2 
Choices, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, §1, at 12 [hereinafter Bragg, Mother’s Defense]. 
  Among the most publicized of such cases in recent years 
are those of two New Jersey teenagers, Melissa Drexler and Amy 
Grossberg.  Melissa Drexler suffocated her newborn in the bathroom of a 
banquet hall while attending her senior prom in New Jersey, disposed of 
 52. Id. 
 53. Rick Bragg, Arguments Begin in Susan Smith Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at 
A10 [hereinafter Bragg, Arguments Begin]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 24; see also ADVISORY BOARD, CHILD ABUSE supra note 
39, at 8-9. 
 56. See Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 24. 
 57. See id. at 23-25.  Finkelhor estimates that only a third of the homicides of children 
under one are what he labels “infanticides,” i.e., the killing of unwanted children or children 
who are victims of mentally ill or incompetent, disorganized, or overwhelmed caretakers.  
Id. at 24-25. 
 58. See generally Resnick, Murder of the Newborn, supra note 12. 
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the body in the trash, and returned to the dance floor.59  She earned the 
sobriquet of “Prom Mom,” pled to aggravated manslaughter, received a 
sentence of fifteen years in prison, and served two years prior to release.60  
Amy Grossberg and Brian Peterson killed their newborn, which was 
conceived in their senior year in high school.61  Peterson was sentenced to 
serve two years in prison and Grossberg two-and-a-half years in prison in 
plea agreements.  Both these young women concealed their pregnancies (in 
Drexler’s case from her boyfriend as well as her family and friends) and 
were unable or unwilling to acknowledge that they would in the normal 
course give birth and become mothers.62  The media reflected the two 
competing narratives of teenage neonaticide with cultural traction:63 that 
these young people were depraved and licentious, and that these not-yet-
women were overwhelmed because they lacked the maternal resources that 
grown women have.  The depravity account may have gained conviction if 
it was not inspired by the social status of the teenagers.64  Although there 
have been some severe sentences in teenage neonaticide cases, the 
institutional response tends to be rather mild.65
In Texas, the consequences for teens and young women tend toward 
greater severity.
 
66
 
 59. Ronald Smothers, Guilty Plea by Mother, 20, in Prom Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
1998, at B1. 
  Under Texas law, persons as young as fourteen can be 
 60. Karen Demasters, “Prom Mom” Released, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at 6. 
 61. Karl Vick, Young Love and Dead Baby Tear at the Heart of Delaware, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 22, 1996, at A1. 
 62. Abby Goodnough & Bruce Webber, The Picture of Ordinary; Before Prom Night, a 
Suspect Was the Girl Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at B1. 
 63. Media portraits of these teens sometimes reflected both views.  See, e.g., Elizabeth 
Gleick, Three Kids, One Death; They Were Happy and Well-Off.  Why Did Two Teens 
Dump Their Baby, Possibly After Crushing Its Skull?, TIME, Dec. 2, 1996, at 69; see also 
Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 5, at 27-30 (discussing the ambivalence teen 
neonaticide cases induce in society). 
 64. Vick, supra note 61.  Grossberg and Peterson were from a privileged family in a 
privileged community.  Both, for example, were described as living in a “gabled tract 
mansion.”  Id.  Drexler may have appeared to many who followed her case to be more 
privileged than she in fact was.  The Prom Mom was lower middle class.  She hoped to 
pursue a course in fashion design after graduation from vocational high school.  Her 
sobriquet may have suggested more social ease and cachet.  See Goodnough & Webber, 
supra note 62. 
 65. See Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 5, at 25-30. 
 66. A question that can be raised but cannot easily be answered is the extent to which 
infanticidal teens and young women escape prosecution because of the sympathetic 
response of street-level bureaucrats, such as police.  See Michelle Oberman, Understanding 
Infanticide in Context: Mothers Who Kill, 1870-1930 and Today, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 707, 733 (2002) (discussing this phenomenon in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Chicago).  The question of the survival of this practice is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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certified for trial as adults for serious felonies,67 and face an array of 
sentences that include life for capital murder,68 and ninety-nine years for 
serious injury of a child.69  Texas juvenile prosecutors will not brook 
medical diversion unless a psychological evaluation establishes that the 
teen mother did not comprehend the nature of her act.70  Absent mitigation, 
such as rape, incest, mental illness, or retardation, juvenile prosecutors are 
likely to seek certification for trial as an adult in a neonaticide case and, if 
unsuccessful, to seek a conviction in juvenile court that carries a 
determinate sentence as high as forty years.71  The juvenile court has the 
power in cases it deems appropriate to deny certification and deny a 
determinant sentence.72  The court may prefer to adjudicate the teen as a 
delinquent.73  The effect of either adjudication as a delinquent or a sentence 
of a term a years by the juvenile court is that the release date of the teen 
then falls to the discretion of Texas Youth Commission (TYC).74  For a 
first degree felony the offender must serve three years.75
Prosecutors report that the incidence of teen neonaticides prosecuted in 
Texas is very small.
  But with this 
proviso, the mission of the juvenile justice regime remains rehabilitative.  
Thus, while TYC has the power to send a teen convicted of neonaticide to 
adult prison to continue serving her sentence, it equally has the power to 
release a rehabilitated teen at jeopardy for a decades-long determinant 
sentence after a short incarceration.  Texas law, culture and practice may 
make it unlikely that a teen convicted of neonaticide would escape 
incarceration and be subject only to probation or diversion; but, if the teen 
avoids certification, criminal sanctions may well approximate the leniency 
of other jurisdictions. 
76
 
 67. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(a)(6) (Vernon 2005); see generally ROBERT O. 
DAWSON, TEX. JUVENILE PROB. COMM’N, TEXAS JUVENILE LAW 139 (6th ed. 2004). 
  Some confirmation of this judgment is to be found 
 68. The murder of a child under six years of age is a crime that is eligible for capital 
punishment.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8), (b) (Vernon 2005). 
 69. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.32, 22.04 (Vernon 2005). 
 70. Telephone Interview with Kris Moore, Harris County Assistant Dist. Attorney, 
Juvenile Div., in Houston, Tex. (June 29, 2005). 
 71. Telephone Interview with Kris Moore, Harris County Assistant Dist. Attorney, 
Juvenile Div., in Houston, Tex. (July 7, 2005); Telephone Interview with Donna Schardt, 
Dallas County Assistant Dist. Attorney, in Dallas, Tex. (July 7, 2005). 
 72. See generally DAWSON, supra note 67, at 422-54. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 441. 
 76. See Telephone Interview with William Hawkins, Harris County Assistant Dist. 
Attorney, Juvenile Div., in Houston, Tex. (June 29, 2005) (William Hawkins could recall 
only one such case in his four-and-a-half years as a juvenile prosecutor in Harris County); 
see also Telephone Interview with Gary Arie, Dallas County Assistant Dist. Attorney, 
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in the paucity of reports of teen neonaticides in the three major Texas 
metropolitan newspapers77 over a period of twelve years.78  A fifteen-year-
old was sentenced to three years youth custody for the crime of 
intentionally causing serious bodily injury to a child for the blunt trauma 
killing of her child then left in a trash bin.79  An eighteen-year-old was 
sentenced to ten years for injury to a child and child endangerment for the 
killing of her son and leaving him in a trash bag in her bedroom.80  A 
sixteen-year-old was sentenced to forty-five years for killing her newborn 
son.81
The failure of neonaticidal teenagers to mother may titillate and disturb, 
as much perhaps because these young girls are sexually active as because 
they coped so disastrously with resulting pregnancies.  Such cases, 
however, do not challenge or unsettle our investment in women’s 
biologically-based virtue in natural mothers.  A reassuring explanation is at 
hand: due to their youth, these girls have not matured to the point of being 
women and mothers. 
 
Although the cases to which the media and the public are drawn involve 
married, middle class, and typically white women, and relatively privileged 
white teenage girls, the most likely victims of infanticide and child 
homicide are children of color,82
 
Juvenile Div., in Dallas, Tex. (July 13, 2005); Telephone Interview with Kris Moore, supra 
note 
 born to unmarried mothers, who first gave 
70 (Kris Moore concurred, as did Gary Arie, who speculated that the Texas Baby 
Moses statute, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.302 (Vernon 2005), effective 2001, reduced 
such crimes and noted that teenage homicides of all sorts are dramatically fewer in recent 
years). 
 77. The three newspapers were the Dallas Morning Herald, the Houston Chronicle, and 
the San Antonio Express-News. 
 78. The period studied was from January 1, 1993 through May 23, 2005. 
 79. Steve Olafson, Girl Sentenced in Newborn’s Death; Two Relatives Arrested, HOUS. 
CHRON., Jan. 20, 1999, at A25. 
 80. Pete Slover, Teen Jailed in Baby’s Death Hid Pregnancy, Parents Say Newborn Boy 
Was Found Suffocated in Garbage Bag, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 29, 1997, at 1A. 
 81. Diane Jennings, More Visible, Not More Common; Women Killing Children Nothing 
New, but ‘We’re Hearing About More’, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 4, 2002, at 6J (three 
neonaticides by adult women were also reported in the three metropolitan dailies in the same 
time period); see Infant’s Birth to be Focus of Mother’s Murder Trial, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Oct. 6, 1993, at 32A (Susan Bienek was sentenced to nine years for leaving her 
newborn child to die in a storage shed); see also Pam Easton, 1 Mom Linked to 2 Abandoned 
Babies; Boy Found Dead in Trash Bin 5 Years Ago Related to Girl Left in Ditch, HOUS. 
CHRON., Aug. 10, 2003, at A34; Thom Marshall, Mother Won’t Plead Insanity in Infant’s 
Smothering Death, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 17, 2004, at A9 (Kenisha Berry, who abandoned a 
newborn to die and was discovered to have killed another newborn, dubbed “Baby Hope,” 
five years earlier, was sentenced to die, although the second victim survived). 
 82. BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.: INFANTICIDE: INFANTICIDE RATES PER 100,000 
POPULATION BY RACE OF VICTIM, available at 
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birth as teenagers, with little education, who have had further children, and 
who live with men who are not the fathers of their children.83
The following table presents the results of a survey of the coverage of 
infanticide and child homicide
  From these 
cases and these social conditions we tend to avert our collective gaze, even 
as our attention is drawn to maternal mayhem and madness in a more 
privileged strata of society—to white married women and teenage girls 
destined for matron status. 
84 in the three largest metropolitan daily 
papers in Texas over a twelve year period.85
 
 
TABLE: CHILD HOMICIDE IN THE TEXAS PRESS 1993-2005 
NAME SEX 
RELATIONSHIP 
TO VICTIM 
NO. OF 
ARTICLES 
Alexander, Kimberly F Mother 21 
Benaissa, Sabrina F Mother 42 
Berry, Kenisha F Mother 7 
Bienek, Susan F Mother 4 
Brown, Katrina F Mother 3 
Bush, Amy McKay F Mother 9 
Camacho, Angela F Mother 46 
 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/kidsratestab.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2006) 
(BJS reports that although the rate of homicide of  black children under five years of age has 
declined in recent years, it remains substantially higher than that of white children—7.4 per 
100,000 versus 2.2 per 100,000); Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 18 (rates among Hispanics 
exceed those of whites but are lower than rates among blacks).  It has been often observed 
that rates of homicide of children less than one-year-old do not vary as much internationally 
as do other homicide rates.  Id. at 24.  While the U.S. rate of homicide of children under the 
age of one year old exceeds those of all other industrial nations, the gap becomes much 
wider for the one to four year-old age group.  See id. at 18 tbl. 2.1.  1995 World Health 
Organization statistics rank the U.S. first in this age group, with twice the rate of the second-
ranked industrial nation.  Id.  It appears that high rates of black and Hispanic infanticide and 
child homicide account for U.S. predominance in this area over other industrial nations that 
may lack large poverty populations.  Id. at 18 tbl. 2.1, 24. 
 83. Overpeck et al., supra note 46, at 1212-13 (provides this profile); see generally 
Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 48 (exploring the links between female poverty and domestic 
violence, both that which is inflicted by men on both women and children and that which is 
inflicted by women on children). 
 84. The stories collected are those with child victims no older than twelve.  The majority 
of child victims were no more than five years old.  Stories involving older children and 
teenagers typically present distinct fact patterns, such as sexual assault and raging attacks 
that may destroy an entire family. 
 85. See supra notes 77-78. 
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NAME SEX 
RELATIONSHIP 
TO VICTIM 
NO. OF 
ARTICLES 
Carter, Kristy F Mother 5 
Cornelius, Tina Marie F Mother 26 
Diaz, Lisa F Mother 46 
Disabella, Angela F Mother 3 
Evans, Demetria F Mother 5 
Garcia, Guadaulupe F Mother 4 
Hamilton, Sharonda F Mother 18 
Hampton, Tameika F Mother 8 
Harris, Kimberly F Mother 9 
Harrison, Lynette F Mother 2 
Hernandez, Yesenia F Mother 14 
Huynh, Linda F Mother 5 
Ivy, Amy F Mother 9 
Katta, Nirmala F Mother 10 
Kibble, Claudette F Mother 22 
Laney, Deanna F Mother 85 
Leija, Juana F Mother 11 
Lewis, Ora F Mother 11 
Maddux, Tracy F Mother 2 
Medellin, Germaine 
Janine F Mother 7 
Moren, Jessica F Mother 2 
Nzeakor, Stacy F Mother 16 
Padron, Yvonne 
Nichole F Mother 4 
Pearson, Samantha F Mother 5 
Perez, Dee Etta F Mother 13 
Peterkin, Ana Marie F Mother 5 
Phipps, Karen F Mother 5 
Pumphrey, Hope F Mother 11 
Rodriguez, Evonne F Mother 30 
Romero, Mary Isabel F Mother 1 
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NAME SEX 
RELATIONSHIP 
TO VICTIM 
NO. OF 
ARTICLES 
Routier, Darlie F Mother 472 
Schlosser, Dena F Mother 51 
Smith, Lisa Marie F Mother 14 
Tolliver, Hazel F Mother 3 
Torres, Olga F Mother 9 
Vernege, Loretta F Mother 4 
Yates, Andrea F Mother 544 
Zamorano, Angelita F Mother 1 
    
Adams, Timothy 
Wayne M Father 11 
Aguilera, Jose 
Guadalupe M Boyfriend 14 
Arocha, Joe 
Dominguez M Father   1 
Barnes, Patrick Nelson M Father 2 
Battaglia, John M Father 75 
Bush, John M Father 16 
Carter Jr., Bobby Dale M Stepfather 5 
Decorats, Phillippe 
Fournier M Father 1 
Dehoyos, Danny M Father 15 
Duncum, Joe Ross M Father 3 
Gonzales, Jose M Stepfather 3 
Guzman, Benito M Father 4 
Holiday, Raphael M Father of one victim 1 
Hughes, Melvin James M Father 3 
Land III, Jesse Alvin M Father 1 
Lopez, Leon Eric M Father 1 
Lugo, Francisco Javier M Mom’s friend? 4 
Mabry, Tremaine M Father 8 
Maddux, Clayton M Father 2 
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NAME SEX 
RELATIONSHIP 
TO VICTIM 
NO. OF 
ARTICLES 
Markley, Jerome M Father 8 
Moren, Bruce M Father 2 
Nakedhead, Tom M Mom’s boyfriend 3 
Nasir, Mohammad M Father 6 
Ochoa, Abel M Father 15 
Pierott, Kenneth M Mom’s boyfriend 17 
Pumphrey, Jason M Stepfather 11 
Rodriguez Jr., 
Raymond M Father 7 
Rubio, John M 
Father of at least 2 
victims 51 
Rumsey, Timothy M Father 17 
Savage, Michael M Father 3 
Skinner, Jon M Stepfather 3 
Smallwood Jr., 
James D. M Father 4 
Tejeda, Jesus M Stepfather’s brother 9 
Tejeda, Juan M Stepfather 14 
Thornton II, James M Father 16 
Williams, Jeremy Fritz M Father 5 
 
The table provides the name, sex and relationship between victim and 
accused in each case, as well as the number of times any of the three dailies 
printed stories about the accused.86
 
 86. If an item appeared in more than one edition of a paper, it was counted only once.  
An Associated Press item that appeared in more than one of the three newspapers was 
counted as many as three times because the story was carried in a second or third news 
market.  Items appearing in the Round Up section of the San Antonio Express-News 
covering out-of-area stories otherwise not covered in the newspaper were also counted.  
Dallas Morning News briefs were counted if they were the unique mention of the item in the 
newspaper for that day; Dallas Morning News “Quick” section stories were not counted.  
Mentions in end-of-year brief summaries of notable stories were counted.  Editorials were 
counted, but letters to the editor were not.  Because information about race was not available 
for each man or woman, race is not indicated in the table. 
  This survey suggests that the 
homicides of poor child victims surface, then fade fairly quickly back into 
the sea of misery from which they emanated, while stories about middle-
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class women killers gain sustained attention.  The stories about minority 
child homicides that have legs are those with bizarre facts, such as the 
south Texas case intimating witchcraft, spirit possession, and the ritual 
killing of three children.87  The only story about a white male killer to rival 
the level of coverage of white women killers involved the tale of an 
accountant who shot his two children in an act of vengeance against an 
estranged wife.88  Poor white child killers of either sex are consigned to the 
same oblivion as poor blacks and Hispanics.89
If the protection of children were our primary concern, we would 
concentrate attention on the conditions that produce severe child abuse and 
the children who may be living at risk.
 
90  A sound child protection policy 
would necessarily be directed at stemming the formation of high-risk 
households by combating teen pregnancy and the truncated education of 
girls living in poverty, and at promoting effective ameliorative services for 
women with children struggling in these conditions.91  It would recognize 
the roots of child homicide in child abuse and that child abuse is often part 
and parcel of lives and households plagued by intra-family violence.92  
Sound criminal law policy would certainly also accord mental health 
defenses to mothers and fathers who kill their children in the grip of 
psychosis and suicidal depression.93
 
 87. Mariano Castillo, Dad’s Trial Delayed for Exam; Decapitation Suspect to See 
Psychiatrist, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 29, 2003, at 1B (recounting some of the 
bizarre facts in a treble homicide committed by John Allen Rubio and his common law wife 
Angela Camacho). 
  Equally, the implications for child 
safety of severe mental illness in parents, whether postpartum or otherwise, 
whether in mothers or fathers, would receive greater attention from 
organized medicine and social service providers of all stripes. 
 88. Steve McGonigle, Trial Will Begin Monday for Man Accused of Killing Two 
Daughters; Domestic Violence History, Mental Problems Among Issues, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Apr. 21, 2002, at 35A. 
 89. See Table: Child Homicide in the Texas Press 1993-2005, supra note 85.  Evonne 
Rodriguez was the subject of the largest number of stories about killers not identified as 
middle class.  The stories about her are devoid of information about status, occupation, or 
income.  She was acquitted by reason of insanity for killing her four-month-old infant in 
1997, but came in for a second round of coverage when she became pregnant again while 
incarcerated at a state mental hospital.  See, e.g., John Makeig, Mom Who Killed Infant Is 
Pregnant Again; Woman in Custody Since 1997 Drowning, HOUS. CHRON., July 20, 1999, at 
A13. 
 90. See Overpeck et al., supra note 46, at 1212-15; see generally Finkelhor, supra note 
13. 
 91. See Overpeck et al., supra note 46, at 1215. 
 92. See generally Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 48. 
 93. The prominence of men and women so afflicted in the population who kill children 
was brought to the fore thirty-five years ago in the much-cited work of Dr. Phillip Resnick.  
See Resnick, Child Murder, supra note 12. 
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There are doubtless multiple, entwined causes or explanations for the 
lack of efficacious child protection policies.  The statistical concentration 
of lethal child abuse among the poor94 may enervate any sense of urgency 
in the more fortunate strata of society.  The sheer size of the impoverished 
population,95 and the limited resources made available to address the needs 
of this population, may hobble effective policy and action.  In Texas, for 
example, scandal has rolled through a number of communities where child 
protective services knew or should have known of children at risk who died 
tragically at the hands of parents and caretakers.96  As with all varieties of 
family violence, child abuse homicide does not arouse fear in the general 
public of the sort that lead to persistent demands for attention to public 
safely because the threat is perceived as confined to the family circle of the 
abuser.97  The brutal mother, father, or live-in boyfriend does not galvanize 
fear about danger to the community at large as does, for example, the 
pedophile lurking near the schoolyard or other criminal predator who is a 
stranger to the victim.98
 
 94. See Finkelhor, supra note 
  Reluctance to pierce the veil of family privacy 
13, at 25. 
 95. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that 12.7 percent of the population, or thirty-seven 
million people were living in poverty in 2004.  CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 9 (2005), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf. 
 96. Texas newspapers are replete with articles about the failure of Child Protective 
Services (CPS) to protect at-risk children.  For example, a court-ordered report produced a 
“scathing critique” of Child Protective Services in Bexar County.  See Tom Bower, Child 
Agency Urged to Partly Privatize; Programs to Recruit Foster Parents, Finalize Adoptions 
Targeted, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 28, 2004, at 3B; see also Tom Bower, 
Diamond’s Sad Legacy; Court-Ordered Report Rips Agency That Failed Little Girl, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 27, 2004, at 1A.  In 2004, the Houston Chronicle reported 
severely underfunded and overtaxed services state-wide.  See Polly Ross Hughes, No Unity 
on Fixing Children’s Services; Some Contend More Money Won’t Solve All Problems, 
HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 1, 2004, at A1.  The Dallas Morning News reports the third high 
profile case within a month of a child abuse fatality whose parents had had previous contact 
with CPS.  See Holly Yan, Girl, 5, Injured; 2 Held; Dallas Police Say Hospitalized Child 
Showed Signs of Abuse, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 19, 2004, at 1B.  At least since the 
well-publicized case, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 
U.S. 189 (1989), the public has been made aware that child protective services all over the 
country are severely strained by their caseloads, and that the consequences can be tragic. 
 97. See, e.g., D. Seaborne Davies, Child-Killing in English Law, 1 MOD. L. REV. 203, 
221 (1937) (noting that in the policy debate before the 1866 Capital Punishment 
Commission, some witnesses expressed Bentham’s point “that the killing of a child by its 
mother did not create the same feeling of alarm in society as other forms of murder”); see 
also NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND: VOLUME I: THE HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 128 (1968) (noting that Fitzjames Stephen was among those who took this 
position before the Commission, arguing both that the infanticide “causes no [public] alarm, 
because it is a crime committed only by mothers upon their newly born children”). 
 98. See generally Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A 
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with intrusive state regulation may play a role.  While not gainsaying any 
of these sources of inattention, I would like to make a case that the history 
of the crime of infanticide is one in which the regulation of women, not the 
protection of children, is the driving, constant element. 
In pre-Christian Europe, infanticide was not a crime.99  Early modern 
Europe and England introduced infanticide legislation to regulate the 
sexuality of the inferior classes and in particular the women of these 
classes.100  In the nineteenth century, the protection of children emerged as 
a novel additional aim of such legislation.101  Further, with the 
normalization of the sentimental bourgeois family as at least the nominal 
ideal for all classes in the modern state,102
II. THE HISTORY OF INFANTICIDE IN EUROPE, FOCUSING ON ENGLAND 
 the most charged figure in the 
infanticide drama ceased to be the lewd working girl and instead became 
the woman at the pinnacle of female status—the married, middle-class 
mother.  This figure debuted in the nineteenth century.  The anxieties that 
attach to infanticides by such women appear to have at least as much to do 
with the protection of cherished views about motherhood as with the 
protection of children. 
A. The Ancient World and the Modern State 
Infanticide of newborns was not a crime in the law and custom of pre-
Christian Europe.103  A father as head of household had the privilege of 
deciding whether to raise a child or allow the child to die.104
 
Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507 (1996) 
(examining some issues surrounding the criminal law’s response to homicides with stranger 
victims versus homicides with intimate partner victims that also arise in the arena of crimes 
against children). 
  This was the 
law of Greece and the law of Rome before her emperors embraced 
 99. Kathryn L. Moseley, The History of Infanticide in Western Society, 1 ISSUES L. & 
MED. 345, 349-51 (1986). 
 100. PETER C. HOFFER & N. E. H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND 
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1558-1803, at 11-25 (1981). 
 101. See George K. Behlmer, Deadly Motherhood: Infanticide and Medical Opinion in 
Mid-Victorian England, 34 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 403, 403-07 (1979). 
 102. See Susan Moller Okin, Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family, 11 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 65, 88 (1981). 
 103. See generally Carol J. Clover, The Politics of Scarcity: Notes on the Sex Ratio in 
Early Scandinavia, 60 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. 147 (1988) (on the law and practice of 
infanticide in pagan Europe, arguing the practice was universal and took its largest toll on 
female infants). 
 104. Moseley, supra note 99, at 349. 
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Christianity in the fourth century A.D.105  Infanticide was also lawfully 
practiced in Europe before the Roman Conquest and among those 
Europeans never subject to Roman control.106  As in most other parts of the 
world, Europeans practiced infanticide for many reasons including lack of 
economic resources,107 preference for male children,108 and out of a desire 
to eliminate illegitimate children109 and children thought to be the bringers 
of misfortune.110
Christianity followed Jewish law in forbidding infanticide.
 
111  
Constantine declared the erstwhile right of fathers to reject a child to be a 
crime.112  In due course, the church forbade infanticide throughout 
Christian Europe.113  The practice of infanticide of newborns, however, 
remained vigorous for all the reasons that had fueled it prior to 
Christianization despite church condemnation.114  In the Europe of the 
Middle Ages, the punishment of infanticide was, practically speaking, the 
domain of the church as the regulator of family life.115  The “overlaying” or 
smothering of infants sharing the family bed with their parents was the 
most prominent and vexing problem the church combated.116  Both man 
and wife were subject to rebuke for overlaying.117  In early modern Europe, 
beginning in the sixteenth century, two profound, linked changes occurred 
in the law of infanticide.  Infanticide along with a great deal else that had 
been regulated by the church became the business of the state.118  The 
crime of infanticide was born, and defined as one committed by unmarried 
women.119
 
 105. Id. at 351-52. 
  Thus, what had been a privilege of fathers became a crime of 
 106. Clover, supra note 103, at 162-64. 
 107. Moseley, supra note 99, at 349. 
 108. Id. at 351; see also Clover, supra note 103, at 160-62. 
 109. Moseley, supra note 99, at 351. 
 110. Id. at 345-46. 
 111. William L. Langer, Infanticide: A Historical Survey, 1 HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 353, 
355 (1974). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id.; see Clover, supra note 103, at 164; Richard C. Trexler, Infanticide in Florence: 
New Sources and First Results, 1 HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 98, 99 (1974). 
 115. See generally Barbara A. Kellum, Infanticide in England in the Later Middle Ages, 1 
HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 367 (1974) (on church practice and penances for infanticide); Trexler, 
supra note 114. 
 116. See Langer, supra note 111, at 356; see also Kellum, supra note 115, at 369 (writing 
that in the later Middle Ages “the three year penance for overlaying became standard”). 
 117. Trexler, supra note 114, at 108-09 (noting that in some places, the penance typically 
was the public humiliation of acknowledging the sin). 
 118. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 11-12; Trexler, supra note 114, at 103, 105. 
 119. Katherine O’Donovan, The Medicalisation of Infanticide, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 259, 
RAPAPORT_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:15 PM 
2006] MAD WOMEN & DESPARATE GIRLS  123 
unmarried mothers.120
Early modern Europe experienced population growth and economic 
change that pushed many out of agrarian life.
 
121  England and other 
countries confronted a growing mobile population of the poor no longer 
subject to village and church social control.122  The more fortunate classes 
were frightened by the unruliness and the perceived sexual license of the 
poor, who were beyond the reach of traditional formal and informal 
controls.123  In this new dispensation there was little tolerance in the wage 
economy for working women with illegitimate children.124  If a pregnant 
woman could not or would not marry the father of her child, she could 
expect to lose her current employment as well as her prospects of future 
employment.125  Her circumstances became dire; she could support neither 
herself nor her child.126  Moreover, the marriage prospects of the unmarried 
mother who worked as a domestic servant or in the factory system were 
inferior to those of her agrarian foremothers, in part because men of her 
class were also economically insecure.127  But more dramatically, 
generations of working women were systematically sexually exploited.128
The state responded to the perceived crisis—the growing menace to 
social morality posed by the licentious poor—by regulating sexual conduct, 
formerly the domain of the church, through the criminal law.  In due 
course, a punitive poor law regime was devised.
  
Neither chastity nor marriage to the father of the child were options where 
sexual access to working women was a privilege of social rank.  This 
formula—economic insecurity, sexual exploitation, and ostracism of the 
fallen—put illegitimate children at risk of infanticide for hundreds of years. 
129  The parents of bastards 
were fined.130
 
259-60; see also Davies, supra note 
  Women who refused to name the father, and men who failed 
97, at 213-14. 
 120. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 98, 101-107 (arguing that unmarried women 
were the target of enforcement of infanticide law in England and the American colonies in 
the early modern period). 
 121. Id. at 8, 12-13. 
 122. See id. at 12-13. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 115; see also Constance B. Backhouse, Desperate Women and 
Compassionate Courts: Infanticide In Nineteenth Century Canada, 34 U. TORONTO L. J. 
447, 448 (1984) (detailing similar settings in Canada). 
 125. See Behlmer, supra note 101, at 418. 
 126. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 115. 
 127. See id. at 13, 115. 
 128. See Langer, supra note 111, at 357; see also Backhouse, supra note 124, at 457. 
 129. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 11-17 (on the social changes that led to the Poor 
Law of 1576, its provisions, and its impact). 
 130. Id. at 13. 
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to support their illegitimate offspring, were subject to corporal punishment 
and imprisonment.131  In England—there were very similar laws on the 
continent of Europe132—the capstone of this regime was a 1623 statute 
enacted by Parliament, the Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering 
of Bastard Children,133 which punished with death any unmarried 
woman—styled a “lewd” woman—who concealed the death of her bastard 
child.134  Such concealment was to be punished “as murther”135 regardless 
of whether the child “were borne alive or not,”136 unless the mother could 
produce a witness that the child was stillborn.137  Thus, the statute relieved 
the prosecution of the burden of proving either that the defendant mother 
had killed the child or even that the child was born alive.138  It shifted the 
burden to the defendant to prove stillbirth or face conviction.139
 
 131. Id. 
  
 132. See Trexler, supra note 114, at 103. 
 133. Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, 1623, 21 Jac., c. 
27, §§ 1-2 (Eng.)  
“Whereas many lewd Women have been delivered of Bastard Children, to avoid 
their Shame, and to escape punishment, do secretly bury or conceal the Death of 
their Children, and after, if the Child be found dead, the said Women do alledge, 
that the said Child was born dead; whereas it falleth out sometimes (although 
hardly it is to be proved) that the said Child or Children were murthered by the 
said Women, their lewd Mothers, or by their Assent or Procurement: For the 
Preventing therefore of this great Mischief, be it enacted by the Authority of this 
present Parliament, That if any Woman after One Month next ensuing the End of 
this Session of Parliament be delivered of any Issue of her Body, Male or Female, 
which being born alive, should by the Laws of this Realm be a Bastard, and that 
she endeavour privately, either by drowning or secret burying thereof, or any other 
Way, either by herself or the procuring of others, so to conceal the Death thereof, 
as that it may not come to Light, whether it were born alive or not, but be 
concealed: In every such Case the said Mother so offending shall suffer Death as 
in Case of Murther, except such Mother can make Proof by One Witness at the 
least, that the Child (whose Death was by her so intended to be concealed) was 
born dead.”. 
 134. Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, §1. 
 135. Id. §2 
 136. Id. §2.  The state would have been at a grave disadvantage from a forensic point of 
view in proving a live birth with the scientific resources of the time, but for the unusual 
advantage conveyed by the statute of not having to prove that the child was born alive.  The 
state would have had been unable to discharge the standard burden under the law of 
homicide of a live birth in an many infanticide cases, absent a witness.  See Behlmer, supra 
note 101, at 410; Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 5, at 11-12.  To this day, the 
difficulty of such determinations hampers infanticide prosecutions of newborns and infants.  
See Jennie Lusk, Modern New Mexican Neonaticide: Tranquilizing with This Jewel/The 
Torments of Confusion, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 93, 110 (2001). 
 137. Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, §2; see also 
O’Donovan, supra note 119, at 259. 
 138. See O’Donovan, supra note 119, at 259. 
 139. See id. 
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Notwithstanding this regime, high rates of infanticide of both legitimate 
and illegitimate children persisted because the social causes of infanticide 
endured.140  The targets of vigorous prosecution, however, were the unwed 
mothers.141
During the seventeenth century, women were indeed executed in 
England for the murder or concealment of their dead bastard children.
  Infanticide—or the concealment of a shameful and criminal 
bastard stillbirth—was treated as a capital crime when practiced by 
unmarried women of the working classes.  Concurrently, the state for the 
most part respected the privacy of married people to make decisions about 
family size and composition in accord with the ancient privilege, now more 
discreetly exercised than in the pre-Christian era. 
142  
This ferocity began abating by the end of the seventeenth century;143 
thereafter, judges and juries proved ever more unwilling to impose the full 
rigor of the statute upon desperate girls, left to pay the piper by libertines 
and absconding lovers.144  The 1623 Act provided only one means for a 
woman who had concealed the death of her illegitimate child to escape 
execution.  If she could come forward with a witness that the child was 
stillborn, she was discharged.145  For the next two centuries the 
development of non-statutory defenses and finally statutory reforms 
checked the execution of mothers of illegitimate children.146  A number of 
defenses evolved that spared women whom eighteenth century juries were 
unwilling to hang.147
Some women pleaded “benefit-of-linen,” meaning that they had 
  The availability of these defenses diminished the 
advantages to the state of prosecuting under the 1623 Act.  The rules 
governing an infanticide prosecution came to resemble in practice an 
ordinary homicide prosecution in that the crown was obliged to persuade 
the jury that the defendant acted with premeditation or at least intent to 
destroy her living child. 
 
 140. See Langer, supra note 111, at 355-57. 
 141. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 22-25 (noting a dramatic increase in both 
prosecutions and convictions of mothers of bastards after the passage of the 1623 statute, 
and the animus against female promiscuity). 
 142. See id. at 24-26. 
 143. Id. at 65, 71. 
 144. See Behlmer, supra note 101, at 410-13 (on the science of determining live birth in 
the eighteenth century); see generally Davies, supra note 97 (on the history of English law 
of infanticide child homicide). 
 145. Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, 1623, 21 Jac., c. 
27, §§ 1-2 (Eng.). 
 146. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 65-66; Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 
5, at 11-14; see also Behlmer, supra note 101, at 412 (the last execution of a women for 
infanticide in England occurred in 1849). 
 147. See Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 5, at 14. 
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prepared to take care of their babies by making or buying linen.148  If 
credited, this defense established that the mother expected to accept the 
child and to care for it.  Women also pleaded “want-of-help,” meaning that 
they were unable because of unforeseen adversity to obtain the help of a 
midwife or others.149  They also defended themselves on the grounds that 
their baby’s death was an accident due to their ignorance or incapacitating 
weakness during childbirth.150  Women could defend themselves on the 
grounds that they were temporarily insane, which was effective if they 
could also successfully assert benefit of linen.151  In addition to the 
development of defenses that relied on lack of premeditation or intent, the 
burden of proving that the child was born alive was in practice shifted back 
to the prosecution.152  These dilutions of the infanticide statute were 
sometimes convenient pegs for outright nullification by juries and judges 
who were unprepared to expose even women they believed guilty of 
deliberate destruction of their illegitimate offspring to capital 
punishment.153  The 1623 law aimed to punish female transgression by 
making women pay dearly for their sexual immorality; when that punitive, 
ostracizing impulse was spent, the English jury no longer saw a shameless 
strumpet in the dock but a desperate girl caught in a shameless system.154  
It appears that infanticide itself, absent the need to smite fallen women, was 
insufficient to warrant such severe treatment in the eyes of the eighteenth 
century English public.155  As antagonism to working class female sexual 
transgression abated, pressure for reform of the 1623 statute mounted; Lord 
Ellenborough’s Act of 1803 repealed the 1623 statute.156
Some reformers were motivated by the harshness of the infanticide 
laws,
 
157 but others were motivated by anxiety that the law’s majesty 
suffered from the blatant gap between the draconian 1623 law and the 
nullifying verdicts rendered by jurors with the tacit support of the bench.158
 
 148. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 
  
100, at 68-69. 
 149. Id. at 69. 
 150. Id. at 69-70. 
 151. Id. at 70. 
 152. O’Donovan, supra note 119, at 260 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 
COMMENTARIES *198). 
 153. See Davies, supra note 97, at 213-23.  In time, juries would not convict, and judges 
would not sentence to death, and the crown would commute rather than execute if there 
were a conviction.  Id. 
 154. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 67-71. 
 155. See id. at 71. 
 156. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, § 3 (Eng.). 
 157. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 86-87. 
 158. Id. at 87 (noting that the reform bill’s author, Lord Ellenborough, was motivated by 
such nullifying tendencies); see also Davies, supra note 97, at 214. 
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After 1803, the burden of proving live birth was lodged with the 
prosecution, eliminating that singular advantage the prosecution enjoyed 
under the seventeenth century statute.  But in another respect, a special 
regime for the punishment of mothers of bastards was retained.  Under the 
1803 Act, the mother of a bastard tried for infanticide, if acquitted, could 
be convicted of a lesser charge, the misdemeanor of concealment of birth, 
punishable by up two years imprisonment.159  In 1828, however, an act of 
Parliament reformed the law so that all women, including married women, 
were equally prosecutable for the crime of concealment.160
The 1828 legislation marks a sea change in the history of infanticide 
law.  Henceforward, the respectable married woman and the mother of a 
bastard were subject to the same de jure regime, aimed at protecting child 
life and punishing transgressive mothers.  There are at least two possible 
explanations for this equalization of susceptibility of all women—at least 
de jure—to investigation, regulation, and punishment.  It has been observed 
that nineteenth century British elites were becoming more invested in 
children and their welfare than their predecessors had been.
 
161  A second 
related explanation is that as child welfare became a more prominent 
concern, alongside the deplorable sexual morals of the lower classes, the 
hypocrisy of categorically exempting the respectable from prosecution 
became blatant.162  I propose a third explanation, a complement to those of 
the enhanced status of children and dawning awareness of hypocrisy: a 
heightened preoccupation with the maternal role against which the virtue of 
the female sex was increasingly to be measured.163
The moral meaning and emotional charge of the crime of infanticide 
evolved over the course of several hundred years.  In the seventeenth 
century, infanticide legislation and prosecutions were responsive to anxiety 
about and hostility towards female sexual transgression.  In the nineteenth 
century, anxiety about women deviating from motherhood norms came to 
the fore, although such concerns did not entirely displace those about 
female sexual decorum.  In the seventeenth century juries were at least 
sometimes willing to hang a bad girl whose execution under the 1623 
statute did not require proof that she had actually killed her child.  In the 
course of the eighteenth century, juries became increasingly sympathetic to 
 
 
 159. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, §§ 3-4. 
 160. Offences Against the Person Act, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, §§ 1, 14 (Eng.). 
 161. Behlmer, supra note 101, at 403-07. 
 162. See Langer, supra note 111, at 360 (“By the mid-century the matter [of infanticide] 
had become one of public scandal.”). 
 163. See generally Moller Okin, supra note 102, who wrote about the emergence of the 
maternal ideal in the weave of female virtue in the bourgeois family. 
RAPAPORT_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:15 PM 
128 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  [Vol. XXXIII 
the plight of desperate, unwed working women.  In contrast, the figure that 
most engages the contemporary public is the married woman who commits 
infanticide.  Every trial as well as every decision about whether to 
prosecute or divert confronts the question, “Is she mad or bad?”164  In the 
United States, both explanations are possible.  In Great Britain, the law has 
normalized a pathological view of maternal infanticide.165
We in the United States have not followed the British in their 
pathological turn; we do not treat maternal infanticide as biological defect, 
medically excused as a matter of law.  Nonetheless, I suggest that 
biologically-based disorder, whether triggered by the processes of birth 
itself, as with postpartum psychosis present in the Yates case,
  In the United 
States, we have neither elected to follow this path nor to reject it. 
166 or other 
deep-seated disease, such as severe depression, as in the Susan Smith 
case,167 is the preferred explanation, and the most comforting explanation, 
in the United States as well.  It is more soothing to the anxiety about female 
compliance with mothering norms to see infanticide as the product of 
disease, biological failure, than of moral failure.  While a punitive reaction 
can be cathartic and can allay anxiety, concluding that, for example, 
Andrea Yates is a very sick woman offers far more relief.168
B. British Infanticide Law in the Twentieth and Twenty-First 
Centuries 
  It is better to 
learn that from time to time that maternal instinct and commitment are 
overwhelmed by terrifying illnesses than that they are too casually 
implanted to resist conventional temptations, such as money, ease, and 
romance. 
It is instructive to consider the history of pathologizing infanticide in 
Britain.  It appears that during the life of the 1623 Act, some women 
charged with infanticide were found to be insane.169
 
 164. See generally Wilczynski, supra note 
  There were also 
seventeenth and eighteenth century instances of married child murderesses 
5. 
 165. See Mackay, supra note 6, at 29; see also WALKER, supra note 97, at 133 (noting 
that between 1961 and 1965, nine out of ten women convicted of infanticide were “either 
committed to mental hospitals or put on probation”). 
 166. Denno, supra note 5, at 26-36. 
 167. Bragg, Mother’s Defense, supra note 51. 
 168. One veteran psychiatrist who had treated Yates in 1999 testified that she considered 
Yates “among the five sickest people” she had ever treated.  Carol Christian, Doctor: Yates’ 
Illness Severe; Did Not Know Actions Were Wrong, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 6, 2002, at A1. 
 169. Behlmer, supra note 101, at 412-13; see also HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 
146-50. 
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being excused due to insanity.170  However, it was not until the nineteenth 
century that infanticide became deeply entwined with the insanity 
question.171
The British have had an infanticide statute since 1922 under which 
postpartum disturbance is at least a partial defense to a charge of 
infanticidal murder, reducing the charge from murder to manslaughter.
  Interestingly, this fusion or conjuncture occurred at the 
historical moment in which married women became susceptible to 
prosecution for concealment.  In Great Britain both the desperate girl and 
the married mum have benefited from the pathological turn.  Both today 
receive a form of medical diversion. 
172  
In 1938 the statue was amended to set the limit of its application to children 
under a year old;173 to accomplish or rationalize this extension, “effect of 
lactation” was included in the revised statute as a ground of mental 
disturbance in mothers.174  This overcame the otherwise awkward fact that 
postpartum illness waxes immediately upon birth and in the great majority 
of cases is very short-lived.175  The reform made clear that, henceforth, 
mothers of older infants were to be shielded from murder indictments.  
That science has not found a connection between mental illness and 
lactation has apparently not proved an impediment to the operation of this 
statutory regime.  The 1938 statute has been interpreted in practice to 
permit virtually any woman who kills her child less than one year old to 
have the benefit of the partial defense regardless of her actual mental 
condition.176  In Britain, infanticidal mothers are constructively mad;177
 
 170. See WALKER, supra note 
 no 
97, at 127. 
 171. Behlmer, supra note 101, at 412-14 (tracing the roots in Victorian medicine of the 
notion, later enshrined in English statutes, that new mothers are subject to forms of 
temporary insanity, such as “puerperal mania” and “lactational insanity”). 
 172. Infanticide Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 1 (Eng.) (reading, in part, “[w]here a 
woman . . . causes the death of her newly-born child, but at the time of the act or omission 
she had not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to such child, and by reason 
thereof the balance of her mind was then disturbed . . .” the infanticide offense will be 
reduced from murder to manslaughter). 
 173. Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.); see O’Donovan, supra note 
119, at 261-63 (discussing the motivation for amending the act). 
 174. O’Donovan, supra note 119, at 261-62.  The stimulus for the reform was the case R 
v. O’Donoghue, (1927) 20 Cr. App. R 132.  See id. at 262.  The 1922 statute was silent on 
the maximum age of a child whose mother could find shelter under the statute.  Id. at 261.  
In O’Donoghue, the judge ruled that the age of her child, thirty-five days, put her outside the 
protection of the statute.  Id. at 262. 
 175. Amy L. Nelson, Postpartum Psychosis: A New Defense?, 95 DICK. L. REV. 625, 634 
(1991). 
 176. Mackay, supra note 6, at 29.  The effect of an infanticide charge under the 1938 Act 
is that the prosecution concedes mental disturbance and thus the defendant need not prove it, 
nor does the jury consider medical evidence.  Id. 
 177. Ania Wilczynski & Allison Morris, Parents Who Kill Their Children, 1993 CRIM. L. 
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serious proof of mental illness or that mental illness caused the crime is 
required. 
Contemporary Britain has moved further in the direction of medicalizing 
maternal infanticide since 1938.178  In the 1970s, reformers attempted to 
amend the law once again in order to recognize explicitly social stressors of 
motherhood, in addition to biologically-based, childbearing-related 
disorders as grounds for reduction of charge from murder to 
manslaughter.179  This initiative did not bear fruit despite the fact that, de 
facto, social factors are accepted as sufficient to warrant diversion or 
mitigation in British cases.180  British mothers convicted of killing infants, 
and to a lesser but marked extent young children,181 are not sent to prison 
but instead are required to undergo hospital or outpatient treatment.182
The British have settled law and policy, a canonical answer to the 
question of whether the mother who kills her child is mad or bad.  Legal 
doctrine in the United States, in contrast, is not liberal in excusing, or 
partially excusing, mothers who kill; it has been justly criticized for failing 
to accord mental health defenses reliably to mothers suffering from 
postpartum psychosis and other grave disorders.  Yet, we, like the British, 
are preoccupied with the question of maternal dysfunction to the detriment 
of a more comprehensive approach to child homicide.  A more 
comprehensive approach would hark back to Resnick’s pioneering work.  
Recall that Resnick found a high incidences of serious mental disorders in 
both men and women child killers and recognized the prominence of 
childabuse as a cause of homicide of children.
 
183
Despite the relative lack of formal, doctrinal support for mental health 
defenses for mothers who kill children in the United States, an examination 
 
 
REV. 31, 35 (“[R]esearch shows that about half of the women who plead guilty to or are 
convicted of infanticide are not suffering from any identifiable mental disorder at all.”). 
 178. WALKER, supra note 97, at 133 (reporting that by the early 1960s, out of seventy-
two women guilty of infanticide, only one was sent to prison, and for a term of six months 
or less). 
 179. See Mackay, supra note 6, at 21. 
 180. See Wilczynski & Morris, supra note 177, at 35. 
 181. Id. at 33-34; see also Mackay, supra note 6, at 29 (noting that women who killed 
children older than twelve months, if not subject to medical diversion, could escape murder 
prosecution or conviction by the reduction of charge to diminished capacity manslaughter 
and related mitigations). 
 182. Wilczynski & Morris, supra note 177, at 34 (reporting that between 1982 and 1989, 
only nine percent of women suspected of child homicide were imprisoned, almost half were 
made subject to hospital orders, and more than two-fifths were given probation orders); see 
also Ania Wilczynski, Mad or Bad?  Child-Killers, Gender and the Courts, 37 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 419, 422 (1997) (a more recent study of forty-eight cases, reporting that 87.5 
percent of filicidal women received hospital orders or non-custodial supervisory sentences). 
 183. See Resnick, Child Murder, supra note 12, at 328-33. 
RAPAPORT_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:15 PM 
2006] MAD WOMEN & DESPARATE GIRLS  131 
of a few well-known cases suggests that the trials of women who kill turn 
upon whether their lawyers can successfully deploy what I will call “the 
Good Mother Defense.” 
III. THE GOOD MOTHER DEFENSE 
The Good Mother Defense is not a recognized complete defense but 
rather a strategy for achieving the best practicable result, whether it is 
acquittal or diminution of the level of offense or mitigation of punishment.  
It may work in tandem with an insanity defense, and is in fact a species of 
mental health defense.  The Good Mother Defense trades on the tendency 
of jurors to find madness or something akin to it the most plausible, and 
least unsettling, explanation for the death of a child at the hands of a 
virtuous woman. 
The insanity defense is rarely used and unlikely to succeed, despite 
popular beliefs to the contrary.184  Infanticidal mothers seem to fare slightly 
better than other defendants who pursue insanity acquittals.185  Yet mental 
illness, and the question—”Was she mad?”—permeates cases where an 
insanity plea is not even entered.  Whenever the prosecution in a maternal 
infanticide or child homicide case is in the unenviable position of lacking a 
plausible motive, where such comprehensible motives as greed, revenge, or 
a pattern of brutality towards the victim are apparently absent, the 
prosecution confronts the disposition to find in madness an explanation—or 
explanation for the lack of explanation—of the anomaly of a mother killing 
her child.  Mental illness therefore functions as a defense in such cases in 
an informal, or de facto, and expanded sense: mental illness provides the 
basis for a bid to avoid prosecution, lessen the severity of the offense 
charged or the offense of conviction, or mitigate punishment.186
In notorious cases, prosecutors may insist on trials and pursue severe 
punishments even in the face of powerful evidence of mental illness.  
Prosecutors may act out of deference to the perceived demand that these 
 
 
 184. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A 
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 188 (2d ed. 1997) 
(estimates from a number of states put the successful rate of insanity pleas at approximately 
twenty-five percent); see also Denno, supra note 5, at 11 & n.87. 
 185. See MICHAEL PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 193 (1994) 
(there is some evidence that infanticidal mothers fare somewhat better than other insanity 
defendants); Michael Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You from Me”: The Insanity 
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1421 n.309 (1997). 
 186. The Juana Leija case, discussed supra note 37, is an example of a case that is well 
known in Houston, where prosecutors accepted a plea bargain for a probationary sentence, 
either from compassion or to avoid an insanity acquittal. 
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killer mothers be subjected to public justice187 or because a trial presents an 
attractive platform for their own ambitions.188  Most infanticides by parents 
do not present these pressures or opportunities because they fail to attract 
sustained public attention.  They may surface in the local newspaper and 
disappear after a few sparse stories about the tragic or sordid act of child 
killing, without benefit of a follow-up story recounting the legal disposition 
of the case.189  The ideal candidate for notorious infanticide case status is a 
married, middle-class white woman.190  It is the failure of these mothers to 
protect and nurture their children that is grist for the media mill and public 
fascination.191  Mentally ill fathers do not fascinate.192  Infanticides in 
deficient, irregular households—that is to say, children assaulted by single 
mothers living in poverty, or by their boyfriends—do not fascinate.193  
Although rates of infanticide among blacks are high,194 nor do black 
mothers who kill fascinate.195  It is those who are perceived to be at the 
pinnacle of the female hierarchy, who set the standards of motherhood 
against which others are found wanting, who fascinate when they fall from 
these heights.196
The Good Mother Defense is a defense strategy, not a formal plea or 
legally recognized defense.  The idea is, when confronted with a good 
  In these cases, prosecutors and the public wrestle with an 
acute version of the question of infanticide: how could she, sustained as she 
is by the race, class, and marital characteristics that define female 
excellence, fail so spectacularly at motherhood, the paramount expression 
of female excellence?  Such women are candidates for the Good Mother 
Defense. 
 
 187. Telephone Interview with Joe Owmby, Harris County Assistant Dist. Attorney, in 
Houston, Tex. (Dec. 30, 2002).  For example, Joe Owmby, the Harris County assistant 
district attorney who led the prosecution of Yates, believes that in a notorious case such as 
Yates the public demands a trial, and that therefore a prosecutor must present the case to a 
jury.  Id. 
 188. See Rick Bragg, Keeping Mother’s Trial in Hometown Could be Crucial, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 1995, at A18 [hereinafter Bragg, Trial in Hometown]; Verdict Gets Mixed 
Reaction in Union, HERALD-JOURNAL (Spartanburg, S.C.), July, 29, 1995. 
 189. See Table: Child Homicide in the Texas Press 1993-2005, supra note 85, and text 
accompanying notes 86-89. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11.  The rate of homicide of black children under 
the age of five, although in decline since the late 1990s, remains at least three times as high 
as the rate for white children.  See id.; see also supra note 82. 
 195. See Table: Child Homicide in the Texas Press 1993-2005, supra note 85, and text 
accompanying notes 86-89. 
 196. See id. 
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mother in the dock, a jury will find mitigation in madness.  In a capital case 
(an eventuality rendered much more likely if there is more than one 
victim)197 the best achievable outcome may be life imprisonment.  The 
good mother defense trades on the disposition to accept that a woman who 
kills her children, if a good mother, is mad even if she cannot qualify for 
the stringently defined insanity defense.  But deployment of the defense 
must contend with standards for “the good mother” that may defeat 
otherwise apt defendants.198
Andrea Yates and Susan Smith 
  The defense is therefore parlous for both the 
defendant and the state.  Let us examine the operation of this defense in 
three notorious capital cases, two of which achieved national and 
international notoriety—those of Susan Smith and Andrea Yates—and a 
Dallas case notorious in Texas, that of Darlie Routier.  Yates and Smith 
admitted killing their children while Routier denied she had done so.  The 
Yates and Smith cases resulted in life sentences; Darlie Routier is on death 
row. 
In 2001, Andrea Yates methodically drowned all five of her children in 
the bathtub of her suburban Houston home in the span of an hour; the 
youngest child was six months old and the oldest was seven years old.199  
Andrea Yates, a college-educated nurse200 and the wife of a NASA 
engineer,201 was a stay-at-home mom.202  She was, at the time of her 
crimes, and at the time of her trial, severely mentally ill,203 although just 
how mentally ill was disputed.204  The decision to prosecute Yates was 
severely criticized by mental health and feminist advocates who called 
attention to her grave mental condition.205
 
 197. SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 45-50 (1989) (finding that the circumstance of multiple 
victims was most heavily correlated with a capital sentence). 
  The state justified prosecution 
by appealing both to the enormity of the crime and the deterrent value of 
 198. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 199. Mike Glenn et al., Mom of 5: “I Killed My Kids;” Children May Have Died in Tub, 
HOUS. CHRON., June 21, 2001, at A1. 
 200. See Denno, supra note 5, at 7-8 (providing Yates’ life history). 
 201. S. K. Bardwell et al., Mom Details Drownings of 5 Kids, HOUS. CHRON., June 22, 
2001, at A1. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Denno, supra note 5, at 27-34 (reprising Andrea Yates’ mental health history). 
 204. Most notably, Yates’ degree of mental illness was disputed by the state’s psychiatric 
expert, Dr. Park Dietz.  See id. at 37-47 (providing painstaking exposition and critique of 
Dietz’ contribution to the Yates case). 
 205. Lisa Teachey, Several Groups Rally Behind Drive to Assist Yates, HOUS. CHRON., 
Aug. 28, 2001, at A15. 
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conviction.206  The state maintained that although concededly mentally ill, 
Yates was legally sane under Texas law, and she was therefore morally 
responsible for her actions.207  The case presented dueling mental health 
experts, most notably Parks Dietz for the prosecution, and Philip Resnick 
for the defense.208  The trial revealed horrifying details of a very sick 
woman sinking in the midst of her unresponsive family and ineffective 
medical intervention.209  Treating psychiatrists and expert witnesses for 
both state and defense told the painful story: the suicide attempts, the 
postpartum psychosis, the warnings that such psychosis might return with 
her last pregnancy.210  Andrea Yates testified that although she planned the 
killing of her children, she did it because the children were not “developing 
correctly”211 and would be damned as a consequence if they lived to 
adulthood,212 and that this was her fault because she was not a good 
mother.213  She also told several psychiatrists that she was possessed by the 
devil and heard satanic voices in her head telling her to kill the children.214
In 1994, Susan Smith strapped her fourteen-month-old and three-year-
old sons into their car seats and sent the car plunging down a ramp into a 
lake near her small-town South Carolina home.
 
215
 
 206. Carol Christian & Lisa Teachey, Yates Found Guilty; Jury Takes 3 ½ Hours to 
Convict Mother in Children’s Deaths, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 13, 2002, at A1 (“[Prosecutor] 
Owmby began the closings by saying Yates should be convicted as a deterrent to similar 
crimes.”). 
  Smith precipitated her 
notoriety by broadcasting pleas for the safe return of her two children, 
 207. Denno, supra note 5, at 37-47.  This was the substance of Dr. Dietz’s testimony.  Id. 
 208. Id. at 47-49 (Denno recounts the perspective of the defense psychiatrists, most 
prominent among whom was Dr. Philip Resnick.  Resnick described Yates’ motives as 
“‘altruistic,’ . . . that she believed that she was sending her children to heaven and, in setting 
herself up for execution, ridding the world of Satan.”). 
 209. Carol Christian, Witness Tracked Decline of Yates; Friend Testifies on Lack of Care, 
HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 1, 2002, at A1 [hereinafter Christian, Witness Tracked Decline].  
Debbie Holmes, a former nurse colleague and close friend of Yates, gave revealing and 
affecting testimony.  Holmes repeatedly begged Rusty Yates, Andrea’s husband, to seek 
medical help.  Holmes describes Yates in the weeks before the homicides as virtually mute, 
expressionless, increasingly thin and thus “looked like a cancer patient,” not bathing and, 
wandering aimlessly through the house, and being inattentive to her children.  Id. 
 210. See Denno, supra note 5, at 27-34, 37-49. 
 211. Transcript of Andrea Yates’ Confession, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 21, 2002, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/drownings/1266294.html. 
 212. See Christian, Witness Tracked Decline, supra note 209. 
 213. Transcript of Andrea Yates’ Confession, supra note 211. 
 214. Denno, supra note 5, at 37-38, 47-48. 
 215. Rick Bragg, Police Say Woman Admits to Killings as Bodies of 2 Children Are 
Found Inside Her Car, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at A1 [hereinafter Bragg, Woman Admits 
to Killings]. 
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whom she claimed were taken by a black carjacker.216  Nine days later she 
confessed that the black man was pure invention and that she had drowned 
her children.217  She was excoriated as a scheming liar who cannily 
exploited American racism to deflect blame.218
Smith was a married woman in the process of divorcing her husband.
 
219  
Her class position is ambiguous.  Her parents were blue collar,220 but her 
mother married a local notable.221  She was a high school graduate222 and a 
secretary.223  Her husband was an assistant manager at a Winn Dixie 
supermarket.224
The state’s case against Smith was that she killed her children to 
improve her romantic chances with a lover who rejected her because he did 
not wish to take on the role of stepfather of another man’s children.
 
225  
Smith’s lawyers kept the prosecution and an avid public guessing about 
whether an insanity plea would be entered,226 thus raising the issue of her 
mental condition, but in the end she did not enter an insanity plea.227  But 
there were many dramatic revelations about Susan Smith that turned an 
antagonistic hometown public mortified by her notoriety and horrified by 
her crimes into staunch opponents of capital punishment.228
 
 216. Id. 
  Susan Smith, 
in the hands of her able defense attorneys, morphed from a promiscuous 
schemer into a childlike victim whose overburdened psyche could not bear 
the weight of the injustices life had heaped on her fragile young 
 217. Id. 
 218. Ronald Smothers, Town, Feeling Betrayed, Reviles Woman Accused of Killing Sons, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1994, §1, at 1. 
 219. Bragg, Woman Admits to Killings, supra note 215. 
 220. Rick Bragg, Life of a Mother Accused of Killing Offers No Clues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
6, 1994, §1, at 1 [hereinafter Bragg, Life of a Mother]. 
 221. Id.; see also Report: Susan Smith Reported Stepfather for Sexual Molestation, 
HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Nov. 27, 1994, at 3B (describing stepfather Beverley Russell as a 
stockbroker and tax consultant, Republican state executive committeeman, and a member of 
the advisory board of the Christian Coalition). 
 222. Bragg, Life of a Mother, supra note 220. 
 223. Rick Bragg, Insanity Plea Expected in Boys’ Drownings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, 
at A18  (“Her $17,000 salary as a secretary . . . was augmented by child support.  In a mill 
town in the Deep South, $17,000 a year is middle class.”). 
 224. Bragg, Woman Admits to Killings, supra note 215. 
 225. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53. 
 226. See Bragg, Mother’s Defense, supra note 51; Rick Bragg, Prosecutor of Susan Smith 
Offers a Small Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1995, §1, at 6 [hereinafter Bragg, 
Prosecutor of Susan Smith]. 
 227. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53. 
 228. Bragg, Trial in Hometown, supra note 188 (describing Union, South Carolina 
residents as at first viewing Susan as “evil incarnate”). 
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shoulders.229
The facts that emerged were sordid, but in the end produced 
sympathy.
 
230  Her husband was unfaithful.231  Her stepfather had molested 
her.232  Her wealthy boyfriend spurned her because she lacked the breeding 
and education he wanted in a wife.233  She had a history of depression.234  
The defense theory of the case was that Susan Smith drowned her children 
not with premeditation or even intentionally, but in a swirl of “suicidal 
confusion.” 235  Smith, the defense argued, was in crisis; her chronic 
depression had progressed to an acutely suicidal pitch.236
During the penalty phase of both trials, prosecutors were faced with a 
motive deficit in asking their juries to believe that these women were 
among the worst of the worst—murderers who deserved death.  The Smith 
case is even more instructive than the Yates case in highlighting the 
difficulty a prosecutor can face in prosecuting infanticides.  The 
prosecutors in the Smith case argued that Smith
 
237 was a self-centered 
woman who found her children burdensome.  The state portrayed the 
defendant as seeking to improve her romantic and marital prospects by 
disencumbering herself of her young sons.238
 
 229. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 
  These accusations, however, 
suffered from a banal lack of heft as an explanation of child murder.  The 
Yates prosecution contended with the fact that not a scintilla of evidence of 
the slightest disreputable conduct on Yates’ part at home or abroad—
excepting, of course, the murder of her children—had been put in evidence 
53.  From their opening the defense portrayed 
Susan Smith as “child-like and overwhelmed by depression.”  Id. 
 230. Rick Bragg, Susan Smith Verdict Brings Relief to Town, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1995, 
§1, at 16. 
 231. Twila Decker & Cliff LeBlanc, Smith Divorce May Fuel Trial; Prosecution and 
Defense Mine Infidelity Evidence, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), July 15, 1995, at A1. 
 232. Mother Held in Killings Was Abused, Papers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1995, at 
A14. 
 233. Rick Bragg, Smith Jury Hears of 2 Little Bodies, and a Letter, in the Lake, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 20, 1995, at A16 [hereinafter Bragg, Smith Jury].  Tom Findlay rejected Smith 
both because he did not want her ready-made family and because her mill worker 
background made her an unsuitable mate for one in his privileged status.  See id. 
 234. Bragg, Mother’s Defense, supra note 51. 
 235. Al Dozier, Smith Courtroom Drama Begins, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), July 19, 
1995, at 18A (quoting defense attorney Judy Clarke). 
 236. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53. 
 237. Id.  The prosecution portrayed Smith as a “selfish, malicious killer who sacrificed 
her children for the love of the son of a rich industrialist.”  Id.; see also Defense May Use 
Abuse Claim, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), May 20, 1995, at 3B (reporting that the state will 
portray Smith “as a self-centered schemer who used sex to manipulate men, and who killed 
her children because she felt they were getting in the way”). 
 238. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53. 
RAPAPORT_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:15 PM 
2006] MAD WOMEN & DESPARATE GIRLS  137 
or alleged in media reports.239
Neither the Smith or the Yates prosecution was able to dispute copious 
testimony that, bracketing the admitted fact that each had killed her 
children, each was a good mother—a doting mother in Smith’s case,
 
240 and 
a consummately dutiful mother in Yates’ case.241
Susan loved her children. 
  The enormity of their 
crimes defies the explanation that a sane woman chafing at the demands of 
motherhood would resolve her unhappiness by slaughtering her children.  
The banality of the prosecution’s human or motivational explanation could 
not withstand the comfort-giving polysyllogism that the defense strives to 
evoke in the jury: 
[Therefore] Susan would not harm them. 
[Therefore] she must have been crazy. 
Darlie Routier 
In 1996, Darin Routier awakened to screams and cries for help from his 
wife Darlie.242  He bolted down the stairs of his suburban Dallas home to 
find two of his three sons, aged five and six, dying from stab wounds.243  
His wife had also been stabbed;244 she said she and the boys were attacked 
by an intruder as they lay sleeping in the family’s first floor living room.245
 
 239. Prosecutor Joe Owmby expressed frustration with his inability to find evidence that 
would support his own intuition that Andrea Yates coveted a more comfortable, less 
demanding life. Telephone Interview with Joe Owmby, supra note 
  
Darlie was in due course charged, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 
187.  At trial, 
prosecutors had asked for a capital conviction on the grounds that there was deterrence 
value in convicting the mentally ill but legally sane defendant.  Prosecutor Williford said in 
closing at the guilt and innocence phase of the trial, “To find her not guilty by reason of 
insanity is to say that we no longer have self-accountability in our society.”  Christian & 
Teachey, supra note 206.  At the penalty phase of the trial, prosecutors did not press for the 
death penalty.  Carol Christian, Jury Gives Yates Life Term with No Parole for 40 Years, 
HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 16, 2002, at A1.  Prosecutor Joe Owmby believes it was right to 
prosecute capitally, to ask the jury to decide between life and death, and for the jury to opt 
for life.  Telephone Interview with Joe Owmby, supra note 187. 
 240. Rick Bragg, Smith Defense Portrays Life of ‘Chaos,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1995, at 
A14. 
 241. Yates, a competitive swimmer and excellent student, gave up a career in nursing to 
marry Russell Yates.  She became a stay-at-home, home-schooling mom in submission to 
her husband and their common fundamentalist faith.  See Denno, supra note 5, at 7-8, 31. 
 242. Michael Saul, Kin Relate Account of Rowlett Slayings; 5-Year-Olds Cries Saved 
Mom, Relative Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 11, 1996, at 19A [hereinafter Saul, Kin 
Relate Account]. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
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murder of five-year-old Damon.246  Darlie Routier has never admitted 
guilt.247  Trauma-induced memory loss, she claims, has severely limited 
her recall of the attack.248  Her husband249 and family have vehemently 
defended her,250
Before the commencement of the trial, the state of Texas knew the 
Routier family intimately.  Darlie and Darin Routier were young—twenty-
six and twenty-eight respectively—when the murders took place.
 denying that so good a person and loving a mother could 
harm her children. 
251  They 
had small town, blue-collar antecedents.252  They had been married for 
eight years253 and had three children,254 the youngest of which, eight-
month-old Drake255 slept unharmed through the attack on his brothers, as 
did his father.256  Darin owned a successful small business.257  After the 
birth of their third child, Darlie stayed home with the children in their 
lavish suburban Dallas home.258  The young couple was extravagant.259  
They were generous neighbors,260 open-handed and brash in their 
enjoyment of their early success.261  As a result of their free spending, they 
were badly in debt.262
 
 246. She was tried capitally for the murder of the younger of the two dead boys; the 
aggravating factor elevating to a capital charge being death of a child under six.  The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in 2003.  See Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 557 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 
  Darlie’s family was stout, even belligerent, in her 
 247. How the Case Against Darlie Routier Unfolded, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 2, 
1997, at 32A [hereinafter Case Unfolded]. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id.  For example, Darin Routier proclaimed that his love for his wife had grown 
since their sons’ death.  Id. 
 250. Prosecutor Admits He Lost His Cool, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 26, 1997, at 2.  So 
relentless were Routier’s family that a frustrated Dallas County assistant district attorney 
called the heckling family “trailer trash” on camera during the trial during an interview 
outside the courtroom.  Id. 
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 256. Saul, Kin Relate Account, supra note 242. 
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 260. Douglas Holt, Mother’s Arrest Relieves, Shocks Rowlett Residents, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, June 19, 1996, at 1A. 
 261. See Kessler & Siskles, supra note 252. 
 262. A Rowlett Mother Accused of Killing Two of Her Sons Remained Jailed, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 6, 1996, at 5B. 
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defense: so good a mother could not have killed her children.263  Texas was 
also treated to some salacious tidbits about Darlie Routier.  She was a 
flashy dresser,264 had breast implants,265 body piercings266 and tattoos,267 
and frequented with her girlfriends a club featuring male strippers.268  
“Trashy” Darlie media accounts and testimony would multiply at the 
trial.269
The state’s theory of the case was that selfish,
 
270 vain,271 and 
materialistic272 Darlie had grown weary of the demands of being at home 
with three small children,273 angry about the realities of the family’s 
worsening financial position,274 and angry also at her inability to lose the 
weight she had but on with her third pregnancy.275  She had therefore killed 
her children to relieve the drain on financial resources and the irksome 
labor of caring for the boys.276
Fearing that pre-trial publicity has poisoned the Dallas County jury pool, 
Routier’s court appointed attorneys secured a change of venue to the small 
town of Kerrville southwest of Dallas.
 
277  The Routiers hired a prominent 
Dallas defense attorney278
 
 263. For example, see Steve Scott, Routier Relatives Violated Gag Order, Prosecutors 
Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 26, 1996, at 25A. 
 to supplant the publicly-appointed lawyers who 
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 265. Id. 
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NEWS, Oct. 21, 1996, at 1A. 
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Her Comments, Psychiatrist Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 31, 1997, at 1A 
[hereinafter Scott, Detective Says]. 
 271. See id.; see also Kelley Shannon, Prosecutor Says Mother Killed Sons, Staged 
Crime, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 7, 1997, at B1.  Months after her third child was born, 
“She was no longer the glamorous, blond center of attention,” Assistant District Attorney 
Greg Davis pronounced in his opening statement.  Id. 
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had the trial moved to Kerrville.279  The defense team tried unsuccessfully 
to move the trial from rural and conservative Kerrville back to Dallas.280  
Despite this rebuff, the defense team was cautiously optimistic in 
anticipation of the verdict in the guilt and innocence phase of the trial.281  
The defense believed that they had established reasonable doubt:282  they 
believed they had undermined the circumstantial case that Darlie 
perpetrated the murders.283  Further, they believed that the state could not 
overcome its failure to produce any plausible motive for the destruction of 
the children in the face of testimony from family, friends and Darlie herself 
that she was a good mother.284  As one member of the trial team put it, “It 
makes no sense that this lady would change from a good mother, a doting 
mother, to a psychotic killer.”285  She, however, was found guilty of the 
murder of her children.286
Unlike Smith and Yates, Routier denied she had killed her children.  As 
a consequence, it was the state, not the defense, that was in a position to 
exploit some evidence that she was depressed and suicidal, the kind of 
evidence that the defense in the Yates and Smith cases had been able to use 
to mitigate blame.
 
287  Financial retrenchment and lost glamour fueled 
depression and suicidal thoughts.288  Despondency loosened her moral 
inhibitions.289
The Smith defense took stories about Susan’s promiscuousness
  It appears that the Routier defense was never able to do 
what the Smith defense achieved: to neutralize bad facts about the 
defendant’s character that might well influence jury members to see the 
defendant not only as a bad woman but a bad mother. 
290
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 and 
pursuit of a wealthy boyfriend and wove them into a narrative of an 
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immature woman suffering from chronic depression, driven to suicidal 
desperation by childhood and adolescent trauma,291 a cold mother,292 a 
sexually exploitive stepfather,293 an unfaithful,294 overbearing husband,295 
and a rejecting boyfriend.296
During both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of the Routier trial, a 
mounting litany of trashy Darlie testimony undermined the good mother 
defense.  The Routier defense allowed the trashy Darlie story to unfold 
unchallenged and unintegrated into a defense narrative.  Perhaps the 
defense thought that being a good mother was a sufficient antidote to these 
bad facts.  In any event, they did not address the problem the Smith defense 
understood: a good mother is, at least prima facie, a good woman; she 
possesses the middle-class virtues of fidelity and chastity, modesty and 
decorum.  Deviations from the ideal of wife as well as mother had to be 
explained or the good mother designation was in peril of being supplanted 
by an incompatible label, like “trash.”  Whatever the role, if any, these bad 
facts may have played in the jury’s verdict at the guilt and innocence phase 
of the trial, the prosecution recycled and built upon them in the penalty 
phase of the trial.  The defense went into the penalty phase in any case 
hampered by the awkward position, familiar in capital trials, of asking for 
mercy from a jury that believed the defendant had lied about her guilt. 
  The defense not only explained Smith’s 
deficiencies but explained them in such a way as to leave intact the picture 
of Smith as a loving mother.  The defense story was that Susan went to 
Smith Lake to take her own life, taking the boys because she could not bear 
to leave the boys motherless in this cruel world.  When Susan bolted from 
the car—when her body resisted the destruction her mind had planned—
she may well not have been cognizant of the fact that her sons were in the 
car, trapped and doomed. 
At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury learned some new bad facts 
about Darlie.  An erstwhile friend testified that Routier feared the police 
would find her store of sex toys when they searched the house.297  The jury 
heard testimony that she was a “tacky dresser,”298
 
 291. Id. 
 and did not wear a bra or 
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underwear.299  The prosecution also directly attacked Routier as a mother, 
bringing forth testimony that she cursed at the boys,300 had on one occasion 
smeared cake on the face of Devon at a birthday party,301 was not a careful 
supervisor of the boys in the house and the neighborhood,302 and had 
offered marijuana to a teenage babysitter.303
In the Routier case, the prosecution succeeded in pulling Darlie off the 
good mother pedestal from which prosecutors were unable to dislodge 
Yates and Smith in the penalty phase of their trials.  Routier was laboring 
under two burdens faced by neither: lack of admission of guilt and lack of 
ability to make mental troubles work for her.  It was the prosecution that 
deployed that evidence to help create for the jury a scenario in which a 
mother might kill, that of a selfish woman in the grip of irrational 
resentments that loosened ego controls.  In two of these death penalty 
cases, juries were moved by pity for good mothers who had done the 
unthinkable under the sway of grievous maladies; in the third, the verdict 
was that the defendant was not a good mother. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps one day we will be able to wean ourselves from our fascination 
with maternal virtue and pay honest heed to children at risk, whether 
because of the mental illness or privations of their parents and household 
intimates.  If and when we do, we will be breaking with centuries of 
censorious confusion between the goals of promoting maternal virtue and 
punishing female vice, and that of protecting children. 
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